Page 39 - TPA - A Peace Officer's Guide to Texas Law 2015

of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that
the person is committing a crime.

The government further argues that, not only was Hill in a high-crime area, but he was there at night,
which, according to the government, is further reason for suspicion. Indeed, a persons presence in a high crime
area at night is relevant. But, again, it is not in and of itself enough to support an officer s decision to stop
or frisk.

The government points out that Hills car was backed into the parking space, which, Burch and Fowler
testified, is sometimes how people park when they want to conceal their license plate and, by extension, their
identity, the officers have learned from experience. It is true that we view the facts in light of the officer s
experience. But it is also true, on the other hand, as Burch testified, that lots of people back into parking spaces
for an entirely innocent reason: because it makes it a lot easier to get out. As Burch essentially conceded, the
fact that a car is backed into a parking space is of little persuasive value in evaluating reasonable suspicion.

Hills girlfriend exited the car and moved towards the apartment building in a manner that the officers
said was quick, brisk, and hurrying. The government contends that the girlfriends hurrying exit from
the car and few steps towards the apartment provided reason to suspect criminal activity. In Illinois v. Wardlow,
the Supreme Court confirmed that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable
suspicion. The Court, however, recognizing that such behavior is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing,
rejected the proposal for a bright-line rule that flight by itself establishes reasonable suspicion.
In conclusion, the warrantless seizure of Hill was conducted in the absence of reasonable suspicion that
he was engaged, or about to be engaged, in criminal activity. Therefore, the seizure violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment, and the evidence obtained there from must be suppressed.

th
U.S. v. Hill, No. 13-60095, (Fifth Circuit, May 29 , 2014).

SEARCH & SEIZURE DRUG CASE BORROWED VEHICLE SUSPECT FLED.

Defendant (appellant) was charged with possession with intent to deliver cocaine. He filed a pretrial
motion to suppress the crack cocaine that officers found during a warrantless search of a van that appellant had
borrowed. After hearing the evidence, the trial judge ruled that appellants original detention was reasonable and
that he lacked standing to challenge the search of the van. A jury then found appellant guilty and sentenced him
to twenty-two years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed, agreeing that appellant lacked standing to challenge
the vans search and upholding appellants detention, even though it was based largely on information from an
anonymous tip.

Officer Zimpelman was dispatched to a food store on Hattie Street in Fort Worth to respond to an
anonymous 911 call. Although the tipster did not leave her name, Officer Zimpelmans call screen displayed
the tipster s phone number and address. According to the caller, a black male named Neil Matthews, wearing a
white muscle shirt and dark pants, was selling crack out of a white van parked in front of the store. This was
a high-crime area, known for drug and weapons arrests. When Officer Zimpelman pulled up to the food store,
he saw a white van in front of it. He stopped behind the van, got out of his patrol car, and walked up to the
passenger side window of the van, while his partner, Officer Smith, approached the driver s side. Appellant was
in the driver s seat of the van, wearing a white muscle shirt and dark pants. He was just sitting there with the
keys in the ignition and the engine off.

When Officer Zimpelman looked in the passenger window, he could see appellants right hand, but
appellants left hand was hidden from view. Concerned that appellant was hiding a weapon because that area
is known for pretty much a high crime rate area, Officer Zimpelman told appellant to show his other hand, but
appellant ignored him. When Officer Zimpelman repeated his request, appellant said that he was showing his

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 32 2015 Edition