Page 108 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency

Orchestrating different forms of knowledge 97

their interaction, fine-tuning and manner of complementing and completing
one another are important as well. And all the elements that constitute mastery
cannot be represented exhaustively because they cannot be analysed and
comprehended in their entirety. We observe, therefore, that composing has
two levels of achievement: the work being created and the artistic practical
knowing that has been generated. The new artistic practical knowing may be
helpful to composers in future composing situations. Proficiency in composing
is not a static state, but a dynamic process that cannot be concluded. It
remains fragile because it is linked to an appraising field of practice that itself
is in constant flux. We therefore understand proficiency to be fundamentally
social, meaning that it is interdependent on the societal organisation of the
artistic practice concerned.

3.3 Forms of knowledge in composing processes: an interpretative order
Frequently (but not always), composing processes contain complex tasks that
indicate challenging achievements. This is why these creative processes often
take months. During that time, various work modes occur: intuitive and
reflective, exploratory and systematic. In this section, we will be using a plural
concept of knowledge to explain agency in composing. This concept encom-
passes jointly generated contents and abilities that can be learned and trans-
formed. Additionally, the meaning and value of any kind of knowledge are
negotiated socially. Appreciation and success therefore depend not only on a
person’s knowledge or artistic achievement, but also on collective processes
within the art world. However, we want to clarify that we do not posit any
causal relation between forms of knowledge and agency or mastery. A person’s
real performance exceeds the identifiable or assumed knowledge that scholars
ascribe to him or her. In other words, the concept of knowledge cannot
answer all questions concerning human agency (see Zembylas & Dürr 2009:
125–130, 141–146). Nevertheless, we consider a differentiated concept of
knowledge to be useful for three reasons. First, it replaces opaque concepts
such as talent, and musicality, and individualistic attributes such as intelli-
gence and creativity. Second, it demystifies complex and demanding achieve-
ments without trivialising them because it requires practical knowledge (in the
sense of proficiency), commitment, experience and insight. Third, it embeds
agency in a collective practice without masking or marginalising individual
qualitative differences in performance.
Drawing on the concepts of knowledge proposed by John Dewey, Gilbert Ryle
and Michael Polanyi, we can contrast two basic forms: 1) artistic practical forms
of knowledge (Figure 3.1), among which we count knowledge of work processes,
situative knowledge and body knowledge; 2) formal propositional forms of
knowledge (Figure 3.2), including scholarly knowledge, local knowledge and
formal technical compositional knowledge. This subdivision is for analytical
purposes. In the observable processes of composing all forms of knowledge
always appear in a dynamic mutual relationship and as an amalgam.