Page 13 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency

2 Introduction

abstractions. Individualist attempts at explanation emphasise personal and
cognitive traits that supposedly characterise the nature of a creative subject
(for further critique see Boden 2004: 11–15; Hill 2012: 91–93). Subliminally,
th
some analyses thus continue the genius narrative of the 18 century. Further-
more, some sociological approaches stress the central role of institutional
structures, gate-keeping, traditions, discourses or ideologies so as to explain
processes of valuation and appreciation. The creative process itself, however,
is viewed as either a black box or a negligible aspect. In this publication, we
will be developing a different approach to exploring artistic creative processes.
The starting-point for our undertaking is the following: we view artistic
practices in the context of different, always very particular tasks and challenges
which are specific to that branch of the arts. It may be sensible for analytical
reasons to separate artistic abilities and objectives from material, occupational
and institutional conditions. These aspects, however, must always be considered
in their interaction and interdependency. We therefore understand artistic
practices as collectively generated, shared modes of action that are socially
pre-structured and organised and have a practical directionality. Hence practices
are intrinsically associated with projects, tasks, commitments, goals, desires
and emotions. They also involve cultural artefacts (e.g. symbols, concepts,
conventions, rules) and material objects, and are constitutively interwoven
with various forms of knowledge, bodily skills and experiences (see Shove,
Pantzar & Watson 2012: 22–25, 35–37, 81–84). They occur in bundles related
to distinct practice domains (see Schatzki 2014; Zembylas 2014b). These
general features apply to composers as well: individual composers are situated
in a musical praxis, in specific art worlds; they interact with others; they
combine bodily doings and reflective analytical practices in the creative pro-
cess; they use material and immaterial artefacts; they negotiate the meaning
and value of their work with peers and other intermediaries; and so on. Com-
posing practices are conditioned by contextual aspects, unforeseeable events
and personal components, which are almost impossible to grasp and analyse
in their entirety and their permanent change. Agency in all its facets is thus
socially conditioned and based on participation and appreciation. Participa-
tion in a practice domain enables practice-bounded experiences and practice-
relevant knowledge. Both are decisive for developing the requisite mastery to
act competently and be appreciated by others. Simultaneously, while agency is
socially conditioned and shared, it is emphatically not impersonal or anon-
ymous. Rather, it is connected to those people who have made the relevant
learning experiences, rehearsed the skills and acquired precisely those abilities
and resources that are critical for their doing.
Agency is an abstract theoretical concept. Earlier theories explained agency
with reference to individuals’ cognitive capacities (e.g. intelligence, rationality,
imagination, judgement). More recent theories also tackle unplanned, spon-
taneous and improvised actions in varying situations and institutionally
structured spheres (see e.g. Giddens 1984; Emirbayer & Mische 1998). They
conceptualise agency as informed by learning, social participation and