Page 20 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency

Introduction 9

In summary, the term “creativity” does not describe a particular kind of
individual action. Rather, it usually metonymises a positive evaluation of the
outcome of someone’s endeavours. Many sociologists thus explain creativity
as the product of negotiations of meaning and valuation within cultural
institutions (cf. Peterson 1990; Frith 2012: 62f.). Yet we may speak of composing
as a creative process, since composers have as a rule acquired domain-specific
abilities. Their explorations, ideas, understandings and creations are socially
embedded, since musical practices and traditions are indeed trans-individual.
Sociological investigations thus tend to focus on valuations, discourses and
institutions, or on musical practices, competences, materialities and con-
stellations. While the former perspective has already been widely scrutinized,
this monograph will pay more attention to the latter. Furthermore, it will add
an epistemic perspective on practice that enriches sociological and musicological
analysis and highlights new issues. Composing processes generate two different
outputs: the composed work and the artistic practical knowledge that has
been gained. Whilst musicologists usually direct their attention more onto the
works produced (scores as well as performances), this publication opens up a
complementary perspective onto components of knowledge, or more precisely
onto artistic practical knowledge, which to our minds is far from a negligible
accessory to the composing process. Our specific epistemic perspective results
from the fact that artistic practical knowledge is in fact the key to understanding
artistic agency.

Notes

1 Over the past 25 years, neuroscience research has substantially influenced cognitive
psychology, to the extent that cognition is now being re-interpreted as being fun-
damentally embedded in the body: the “embodiment thesis” (see Gallagher 2014).
Cognitive activities are moreover embedded situatively – the “embedding thesis”
(see Robbins & Aydede 2009) – and are hence analysed more closely in their social
conditionedness – the “extension thesis” (see Aizawa 2014).
2 The question of why distinguishes intentional from non-intentional actions (see
Anscombe 1957/1963: 9). However, since there are grey areas between the two
extremes, this is not a strict differentiation. Moreover, the concept of intention is an
interpretative construct, as Hubert Dreyfus (2002: 380) remarks: “we do not
experience our intentions as causing our bodily movements; rather, in skilful coping
we experience the situation as drawing the movements out of us”.
3 They were given detailed recommendations on what to note and discuss, such as
daily routines, time resources, disruptions or longer breaks in the composing work,
gathering of material and research, organising the material, ideas they had retained
or discarded, references to other compositions or works, particular technical or
artistic problems in composing, omissions, deletions, corrections, etc.
4 Some of the works may be heard on our website: http://www.mdw.ac.at/ims/komp
ositionsprozesse
5 Some of the codes we developed – education, reference to other artists/pieces,
working space, gender-related statements, research and ideas, immaterial objects,
composing, artistic participants, artistic self-image, material objects, audience,
performance space, predetermined parameters, knowledge – were differentiated
further.