Page 72 - Composing Processes and Artistic Agency

The processuality of composing 61

usually means intellectual and linguistic “generation of meaning”. Both the
historically powerful dualism of body and mind and the practice-related
forgetfulness of modern rationalist philosophy and later idealist philosophy
still have an impact today. They uncouple “meaning” from making and posit
it as an independent entity or an inherent characteristic of an object. The
text-centredness of hermeneutics and the influence of semantics and semiotics
in musicology have done the rest. Sociology likewise neglected the significance
of the body for a long time (cf. Turner 2008: 33) and strongly focused on text-
based attempts instead of on practical accomplishments in situ (cf. Martin
2006). Within this theoretical heritage, understanding appears as an interior,
contemplative, language-bounded reflective act by rational subjects. To free
ourselves of these conceptions, we view understanding primarily as a practical
and domain-specific ability. The philosophical groundwork for this was
already laid by Martin Heidegger (1927/1979: §§ 31–32; see also Dreyfus
1992: 142f., 184f.), who interpreted understanding as the main feature of
human existence (Dasein); by Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953/1968: §§ 150, 154,
182; see also Coulter 1989: 61), who saw it as the skill or rather as the ability
of language users; and John Dewey (1910: 116–134; see also Jung 2010:
147f.), who considered it the organism’s practical response to its environment.
Drawing on this perspective, we regard processes of understanding not pri-
marily as contemplative acts of sense-giving, but as activities that are inte-
grated into practice and take place directly within actions such as seeing,
listening, researching, writing, trying out, etc. (see Schön 1983: 49ff.).
Similarly, we conceive valuing as a situated weighing of alternative actions
that directly or indirectly leads to the carrying out of further actions. Valuing
does not necessarily precede action. It can just as well be integrated into the
flow of action. In this, the aspect of consciousness – for instance, being conscious
of the reasons behind a decision that one has taken – is not relevant here.
Like exploring and understanding, valuing is based on rules or valuation criteria,
where the connection between the activity (the valuing) and the criteria is not
causal, but case-specific. “We do not learn the practice of making empirical
judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion
with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us”
(Wittgenstein 1969/1975: § 140). The same is true of aesthetic judgements, or
valuing. Valuing cannot be comprehended by an aesthetic rationality, but
only within the specific artistic practice community. It is the shared artistic,
practical and epistemic ground that makes individual valuations comprehen-
sible and acceptable to third parties: a shared music tradition, similar prior
understanding and convictions, similar models and paradigmatic examples
(see Born 2010: 192; Heinich 2014: 229), and above all a common musical
practice (see Wittgenstein 1953/1968: § 241).
Viewed in isolation, many micro-acts of understanding and valuing appear
peripheral. However, in their cumulative interconnectedness, they correlate
with an ability to act that we term making. The verb “make” should not be
misunderstood in this context. Clearly, exploring, understanding and valuing