Page 102 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The British Diplomats 89

the persecution of the Jews and the propagation of paganism might disap-
pear also, but as a military and air power Germany would remain as strong
and resolute as ever.” lothian trusted that once Germany’s legitimate griev-
ances were satisfied with appropriate concessions, the country would re-
turn to the league of Nations and then even the controversy over arma-
ments could be resolved. lothian sent the account of his visit to Germany
to Prime Minister Chamberlain and indicated that he would like to discuss
it with him. 177
For several years lothian was a fervent appeaser, but he was not a rigid
ideologue. He underwent a gradual but complete change of mind even
before the outbreak of war on september 1, 1939. When Hitler marched
into austria in March 1938, lothian became uneasy about Nazi behavior.
still, he refused to denounce the Nazis, claiming that the action was “inevi-
table and justified.” Nevertheless, he now advocated “some kind of national
service,” without, however, abandoning his opposition to war, which, he
contended, would “reduce the whole world to communism.” But during
178
the turbulent events in 1938 he decided to read Mein Kampf and quickly
concluded that he had misjudged Hitler, who, he now believed, must be re-
sisted, by force if necessary. When Hitler ordered his troops into Prague in
March 1939, lothian totally reversed his former opinion about the German
leader, whom he now called “a fanatical gangster who will stop at nothing
to beat down all possibility of resistance anywhere to his will.” 179 in april
1939, he publicly announced his change of mind in the House of lords.
shortly after the war broke out, lothian was sent to Washington as am-
bassador with the specific mission of securing american support for Brit-
ain’s struggle against Germany. By all accounts, he acquitted himself very
well, but his efforts were short-lived since he died in 1940 at the age of
fifty-eight.

the failure of appeasement

the chief architect of appeasement, Prime Minister Chamberlain, clung
tenaciously to his benign views of Hitler, not because he admired Nazism or
subscribed to the doctrines of pacifism. He was not indifferent to Britain’s
security, and in april 1938, several months before his major effort at appeas-
ing Hitler was launched, the government adopted a program to enlarge
the royal air Force; within two years it was to have at its disposal twelve
thousand airplanes, and if war erupted, Britain would have the capacity to