Page 103 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

90 The British Diplomats

produce twenty-one hundred planes a month. in short, Chamberlain did
not rule out the possibility of military conflict, but he was determined to do
all in his power to avoid the horrors of World War i; he had no doubt about
his ability to handle the dictator. throughout the 1930s, Chamberlain never
spoke of Hitler as an unstable person whose policies were unfathomable.
He had persuaded himself that he understood the man and could reach
agreements with him that would be reasonable and acceptable to most eu-
ropeans. during the second half of september 1938, Chamberlain traveled
to Germany three times in desperate attempts to ward off war, and after the
prime minister yielded to Hitler’s demands regarding the annexation of the
sudetenland, then part of Czechoslovakia, he told his sister that the leader
of Germany “was a man who could be relied upon when he had given his
word.” even after he led Britain into war on september 1, 1939, Chamber-
lain continued to believe that full-scale hostilities could be avoided. 180
Germany’s rapid and ruthless subjugation of Poland did not lessen his
optimism. On October 8, 1939, he insisted that the Nazis were insufficiently
confident in their military prowess to engage in total war unless “they are
forced into it,” and he had no intention of provoking them. “My policy,”
he wrote to his sister, “continues to be the same. Hold on tight. Keep up
the economic pressure, push on with munitions production and military
preparation with the utmost energy, take no offensive action unless Hitler
begins it. i reckon that if we are allowed to carry on this policy we shall have
won the war by spring [of 1940].” 181 By late November 1939, Chamberlain
was convinced that Hitler’s failure to take the offensive “can only be ex-
plained . . . by the state of ‘abject depression’ in which i believe he has been
plunged owing to his inability to find any opportunity of doing anything.”
He ridiculed the idea of a German invasion of Britain, calling it “fantastic.”
the war, he assured his sister, was going badly for the Führer. He also had
a “hunch” that a “great many Germans” were already admitting to them-
selves that their country could not win, and that by the spring this attitude
would be so widespread that the war would be over. Once that happened,
Hitler and his entourage must be deposed and Hitler himself “must either
die or go to st. Helena or become a real public works architect, preferably
in a ‘home.’” still clinging to the widely held view that Göring was a mod-
erate, Chamberlain was willing to let him “have some ornamental position
in a transitional government.” 182
in fairness, it should be noted that by this time Chamberlain acknowl-
edged that he was not suited to be a “War Minister.” He could not bear
to cope with news of losses incurred by the British military, and when he