Page 108 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 95

X did not advocate a preventive war against Germany, but he did urge
France and other powers to exercise “the utmost energy, [and] firmness”
in dealing with Hitler and to reject any kind of compromise or agreement
based “on empty promises.” France should maintain strong ties with friendly
powers in the league of Nations and under no circumstances engage in
negotiations with Nazi Germany, which in effect he dubbed a rogue state.
agreements with Hitler would be nothing but “scraps of paper.”
On december 19, 1933, one day after he had mailed this letter, X sent
another one that expressed even more alarm over the international attitude
toward Nazi Germany. He had just learned from French newspapers that
three prominent Frenchmen (Édouard daladier, Bertrand de Jouvenel,
and Foreign Minister Joseph Paul-Boncour) had spoken out in favor of
negotiations with Germany to reach a general agreement on outstanding
issues, an approach with which François-Poncet agreed. X was appalled:
1
“such a proposal contains such a danger for France that one must ask one-
self whether these gentlemen on the Pariserplatz [location of the French
embassy in Berlin] have become prisoners of the reichskanzlei [office of
the German chancellor]. in France, we Germans have been accused of hav-
ing forgotten everything and of not having learned anything. that is in
part psychologically true of our people, but why do the responsible French
statesmen and diplomats commit the same mistake?” X repeated his previ-
ous warning: dealing with Nazis will produce only disappointments. the
only correct policy for France was “unyielding firmness.” X predicted that
once “Hitler holds on to the little finger of Mr. Paul-Boncour, then he (see
Mein Kampf) will want the whole arm. Hitler’s Germany knows no bounds
and has no inclination to adapt to a peaceful europe. France has the right
and duty to act in its own interest, the interest of europe and in the interest
of humanity to make it absolutely clear to this Germany, which represents
only a minority . . . [that] despite the pretense of an election on 12 Novem-
ber [1933], its policy should be: tHis Far aNd NO FUrtHer!” 2
X gave this advice to French statesmen when the Nazis had been in power
less than a year, but ample evidence already supported his judgments about
the new regime. With amazing speed, the Nazis had transformed Germany
from a democracy to a ruthless dictatorship. in foreign affairs, Hitler’s gov-
ernment had demonstrated that it would pursue a radically new path by
withdrawing from the league of Nations and embarking on a program of
rapid rearmament. the French government could have spared itself much
pain and suffering had it followed X’s advice.
the government’s reaction to X’s letter is not known, but the authori-