Page 114 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The French Diplomats 101

feared that Germany’s policies would harm his country he sent warnings to
his superiors in Paris. He rejected Nazi doctrines of racism, and although
he did not write with the same passion or frequency as the american diplo-
mats about the Nazis’ persecution of Jews, he did make clear his distaste for
Hitler’s anti-semitism. Quite often, his dispatches revealed the dark side of
the New Order in all its horrors even if he did not always advocate strong
measures by the Western powers to curb Hitler. in short, one cannot put a
label on his political views or his recommendations on how to deal with a
remilitarized Germany, which makes his diplomatic career both enigmatic
and interesting. But it also throws doubt on the quality of his work as an
ambassador in Germany at so critical a time in the twentieth century, when
firmness and steadfastness as well as perspicuity were needed.
François-Poncet arrived in Berlin in september 1931 full of hope that re-
lations between France and Germany could be put on a sound and friendly
basis, not only because he admired German culture but also because he
favored stronger industrial ties between the two countries, which, he be-
lieved, would bring economic benefits to both. He was aware, of course, of
the economic and political crisis in Germany, but for about a year he paid
relatively little attention to domestic politics and even less to the Nazis,
whose strength was growing. On July 28, 1932, he reported to Paris that in
the upcoming elections the Nazis might win between 200 and 245 seats in
the reichstag, giving them the largest representation there, and that this,
in turn, would lead them to demand a share of political power in Prussia
and in the republic as a whole. François-Poncet was close, ideologically and
personally, to the German Nationalists, the staunchly conservative party,
and he had persuaded himself that they would not allow the Nazis to take
over the government. He was also confident that the Nazis would not suc-
ceed in taking power by force. He noted that late in 1932, when a reichstag
deputy asked General Kurt von schleicher, the minister of defense, whether
the reichswehr would oppose such an attempt by the Nazis, the answer
was unequivocal: “Cela va de soi!” (that goes without saying!) 15
But a month later, François-Poncet worried about the possibility that the
new reichstag, which had been elected on July 30 and in which the Nazis
held 230 of the 608 seats, would be not only anti-republican but also hostile
to capitalism. He calculated that the socialist parties of various ideological
shadings (social democrats, Communists, and Nazis) would control 452
votes, more than the two-thirds needed to change the Constitution. But
his anxiety lessened when he realized that the Nazis’ commitment to so-
cialism was far from clear-cut. Hitler, he noted, had received large sums of