Page 115 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

102 The French Diplomats

money from Fritz thyssen and other leading industrialists, and he would
therefore be unlikely to turn against them. the ambassador suspected that
Hitler might be playing a “double game”; he spoke favorably about so-
cialism during the campaign merely to attract the support of the masses,
but there was reason to doubt whether he intended to destroy the existing
economic order. On the other hand, François-Poncet was not convinced
that Hitler would prevail on this issue if the Nazis took over the govern-
ment. He thought that the Nazi movement was seriously split on the most
appropriate economic system for Germany. senior party members such as
Gregor strasser and Count ernst zu reventlow were genuinely committed
to socialism. in view of the “contradictory tendencies” within the party,
François-Poncet found it “impossible to discern which one will prevail.”
16
in saying this, François-Poncet revealed a serious misunderstanding of Na-
tional socialism: he was not yet aware of the enormous and even mystical
power that Hitler wielded within the movement. true, differences on is-
sues surfaced within the party, but in the end it was up to Hitler and to him
alone to decide on the party’s stand on key questions. dissenters could not
challenge his authority successfully.
in the reichstag elections of November 6, held because no party had
been able to form a majority government, the Nazi vote declined from 37.2
percent of the popular vote to 33.1 percent, and the party’s parliamentary
representation slipped from 230 to 196. Four days later, François-Poncet
concluded that Hitler would never gain a majority in the legislature and
that his chances of appointment as head of government were therefore “re-
mote,” although Nazism would henceforth be very likely to play a major
role in German politics. the “National socialist ideology has penetrated
the entire public life of the country,” and the 196 “racist” deputies would
certainly be an important force that no government could ignore. the cru-
cial question was how the loss of votes would affect Hitler: would he be-
come wise or, on the contrary, would it make him more revolutionary? the
ambassador was not sure. 17
it is a sign of the political turbulence and uncertainty in Germany in late
1932 that within five weeks François-Poncet again changed his mind. On
december 15, 1932, he wrote to Édouard Herriot, the foreign minister, that
three paths to power were now possible for Hitler. He could stage a coup
d’état, he might win a majority in the reichstag in the next election, or he
might collaborate with other parties to form a government. Hitler had tried
force in 1923 and had failed, and his chances of gaining a majority in the
reichstag seemed highly unlikely, leaving open the one option that he actu-