Page 132 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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The French Diplomats  119

            their time on military training. and when they “worked,” they participated
            in the “construction of underground shelters” clearly designed for military
            purposes. according to the informer, the military were currently paying
            special attention to the training of pilots. the ambassador learned the exact
            locations of “aeronautic centers” in fifteen regions of Germany. François-
            Poncet concluded that despite Hitler’s many pronouncements in favor of
            peace, the “feverish” pace of rearmament proved that the chancellor was
            preparing for the “eventuality of war.”  in light of these warnings about
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            Germany’s focus on rearmament, it must have been puzzling and frustrat-
            ing for officials in Paris to read the ambassador’s frequent confessions that
            he could not be sure about Hitler’s intentions. indeed, he ended this re-
            port, written on October 25, 1934, with a series of questions that betrayed
            his own confusion about the Führer’s plans: “is he thinking of provoking
            . . . war? . . . is he afraid? it is difficult to pierce his true feelings from one
            day to the next.” 52
              François-Poncet’s vacillations continued throughout 1935, in many ways
            a pivotal year in the consolidation of Hitler’s power. On January 13, a plebi-
            scite on the future of the saar held in accordance with the provisions of
            the Versailles treaty greatly bolstered Hitler’s prestige in Germany. almost
            91 percent of the residents voted in favor of reunification with Germany, a
            clear sign that most ethnic Germans were prepared to overlook Nazi ex-
            tremism for the sake of nationalist goals. in the ambassador’s view, the vote
            undermined the view of those who believed that the Nazi revolution would
            somehow collapse, that it was merely a passing phase, or a “nightmare” that
            would dissipate. “the plebiscite in the saar region removes all doubt that
            this revolution has created a new and durable state of affairs; it proves the
            pointlessness of making a distinction between a Hitlerian Germany and an
            anti-Hitlerian Germany. there exists only one Germany and it is with this
            one [country] that the powers must come to terms.”
              in the same dispatch, François-Poncet noted that since the electoral vic-
            tory the German press had been more moderate than in the past and that
            Hitler himself “speaks a language more conciliatory” than usual; these de-
            velopments might lead some of his radical supporters to fear that he was
            abandoning his intransigence and that he might even be thinking of return-
            ing to the league of Nations. “For this very reason, we would be wrong to
            minimize their importance.” the ambassador was further encouraged by an
            assurance he had received from the German Foreign Office that the govern-
            ment would not “remilitarize” the saar and would not build a new airport
            there. But as was his wont, François-Poncet also warned that it might be
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