Page 37 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

24 The British Diplomats

out, however, issuing an official statement to that effect. Nevertheless, it
would be a mistake to minimize the boycott’s significance. For one thing,
a fair number of Christian businessmen dismissed their Jewish employees
for fear that they would otherwise lose customers. More important, april 1
marked a turning point for German Jews, as it was now beyond any doubt
that the government had made anti-Jewish policies an essential part of its
program. For the Nazi leadership, the boycott was a success because, as
avraham Barkai noted, “it set the stage for tightening the screw of eco-
nomic discrimination and the ousting of the Jews from the economy.” 19

rumbold’s reappraisal of nazism

rumbold followed these developments with growing alarm, prompt-
ing him to reappraise his views of Hitler, his ideology, and the entire Nazi
movement. He now adopted a far sharper and more critical tone in speak-
ing of the Nazis. in the first few days after Hitler’s rise to power, he still put
credence in the encouraging remarks of Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath,
the foreign minister. On February 4, 1933, rumbold informed Foreign sec-
retary simon that Neurath’s impressions of Hitler after several cabinet meet-
ings “were not unfavorable.” the new chancellor had been “reasonable” at
those meetings and on several issues had actually voted against his two Nazi
colleagues. He had also asked Neurath and Johann ludwig Graf schwerin
von Krosigk (the minister of finance) for advice on some matters. But
20
three days later, the ambassador indicated to simon that he doubted Vice
Chancellor Papen’s claim that he had succeeded in persuading Hitler “to
drop his claim to exclusive power” and to “cease aping Mussolini.” accord-
ing to Papen, Hitler had agreed that he would act as the leader of “a political
party [that was] like any other.” rumbold thought that Papen was deluding
himself into believing that he could “harness” the Nazi movement “to the
Chariot of the right.” in fact, considerable evidence already suggested that
Hitler intended to run the country on his own without much concern for
the desires of other parties. He had dismissed many officials in the Prussian
civil service and replaced them with loyal Nazis. also, the government had
resorted to “unscrupulous propaganda methods.” 21
Only a few days later, rumbold described a mass meeting in the sports-
palast in Berlin, held on February 10. in a speech greeted with “immense
enthusiasm,” Hitler denounced the Versailles treaty, the Jews, and espe-
cially the Jewish press; called for the destruction of Marxism; and vowed