Page 39 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

26 The British Diplomats

the ambassador followed all these events with great care, but he also
went to the trouble of attentively reading Mein Kampf, a book whose prin-
ciples, he concluded, accurately reflected Hitler’s policies and ultimate goals.
On april 21, he indicated, in a confidential letter to secretary simon, that he
was now pessimistic about Germany’s future. He had been secretly shown a
letter by dr. Fritz Klein, the editor of the Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, one
of the few newspapers that still maintained “a semblance of independence.”
Klein maintained close contact with Papen and was generally regarded as an
astute observer of the political scene. He thought that Nazism might evolve
into a “more moderate,” though “certainly . . . rather radical,” movement
that might be “supportable.” But he considered it “more probable” that the
movement “will become more and more extreme until it becomes unbear-
able,” which could happen “in a few months.” 26
rumbold was now prepared to draft his most famous dispatch, perhaps
the most famous and most widely read in the history of the British Foreign
Office. sent to london on april 26, 1933, only three months after Hitler
became chancellor, the dispatch ran to five and a half long pages (about four
thousand words) and reads like an analytical assessment of the Nazi regime
that one might expect from a mature, insightful historian after the collapse
of the Nazi state, when the relevant sources were available. the report was
recognized at the time as a masterpiece and within the Foreign Office came
to be known as the “Mein Kampf dispatch.” James ramsay Macdonald,
the prime minister, read it and circulated it to the cabinet, which included
Neville Chamberlain, who was then chancellor of the exchequer.
rumbold began by pointing out that in their first three months in office
the Nazis had not come up with a “constructive” economic policy but had
instead concentrated on achieving “unchallenged supremacy” and on estab-
lishing “a regime of brute force” with ultimate authority in Hitler’s hands.
“the Nazi leader has only to express a wish to have it fulfilled by his fol-
lowers.” rumbold conceded that the president and the reichswehr (armed
Forces) might still have some restraining influence on the government, but
he predicted, accurately it turned out, that once the president died—which
happened in august 1934— the reichswehr would abandon its reservations
and throw in its lot with the Führer. it therefore seemed advisable to rum-
bold to devote an entire dispatch to Hitler “and the uses to which he may
put his unlimited opportunities during the next four years.”
the foci of the dispatch are Hitler’s fanaticism, his commitment to mili-
tarism, his intention to expand into russia and the Baltic states “by force
of arms,” and his cleverness in lulling Germany’s adversaries “into such a