Page 55 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

42 The British Diplomats

in 1959, Burton H. Klein published a book with the controversial thesis
that when World War ii began in 1939, the Nazi leadership had not yet put
the country on a full war footing. that assessment seems to be true, but it
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is also true that the process of remilitarization began in 1933 and progressed
at a rapid pace, which suggested that the country was preparing for conflict
at some future date. the British diplomats in Germany certainly feared as
much, and in closely following the rearmament program, sent a stream of
messages on the subject to london. the first concern, as already noted, was
the growth of the ss and sa, paramilitary groups that, it was feared, could
easily be turned into regular army units in a time of conflict. Hitler denied
that either one of the services could be considered as in any way strengthen-
ing the country militarily, but no British diplomat believed him. they noted
that these organizations alone increased Germany’s military establishment
by about 880,000 men. in september 1933, Colonel andrew thorne, the
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military attaché to the British embassy in Berlin, prepared a report that con-
cluded that the “so-called semi-military associations,” as he called the ss and
sa, should definitely be considered as “part and parcel of the German de-
fence forces and . . . their leaders are possessed of the determination and fa-
cilities to make them fit for their roles.” thorne emphasized that the men in
the two organizations received vigorous training and that they were known
for their toughness, dedication, and experience derived from military service
in World War i. in “keenness and discipline, if not yet in training,” the Nazi
units were already superior to the British territorial army. 63
But that was only part of the story. in July 1934, thorne reported that
Germany intended to increase the reichswehr to 300,000, triple the num-
ber permitted under the treaty of Versailles, and to boost substantially the
supply of officers needed to supervise the growth and leadership of the new
army. the German government had promised to allow foreign military at-
tachés to visit military training camps, but suddenly the visits were “indefi-
nitely postponed with very unconvincing explanations.” For six months,
foreign observers could not obtain any information on the progress of rear-
mament. 64
the most alarming step in German rearmament was announced on
March 15, 1935, in a Proclamation to the German People: the government
would immediately establish compulsory military service, clearly another
violation of the treaty of Versailles. according to Consul General Gainer
in Munich, the announcement was greeted with many parades and dem-
onstrations. Gainer thought that the enthusiasm was not necessarily a sign
of approval for conscription itself but, rather, an expression of relief that