Page 60 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The British Diplomats 47

entries in his diary, indicates that during his four years in Germany, the pe-
riod when Hitler could have been humbled and stopped in his tracks with-
out bloodshed, he served his country well. at that time, he placed much
more emphasis on the dangers of Nazism than on the feasibility of reaching
agreements with Hitler. as a seasoned diplomat, he tended to avoid the ap-
pearance of rigidity.
From his earliest days in Berlin, Phipps argued against any weakening of
Britain’s military posture. in december 1933, he expressed alarm at newspa-
per accounts in Germany that pacifism was a growing movement in Great
Britain. the German ambassador to london had reported that during a
local election in Fulham in October 1933, the labour candidate who fa-
vored rearmament was dubbed a warmonger, and as a result had lost the
election. Phipps warned that if the Führer, who attached great significance
to these reports, believed that large sectors of the British public held pacifist
views and were prepared to accept peace at any price, he and his subordi-
nates would “open their mouths wider than ever.” two years later, when
83
it appeared that Hitler had abandoned his frequent disavowal of interest
in regaining the colonies in africa, Phipps cautioned against giving in to
Germany’s demands. a return of even some colonies “would, i have always
felt, only constitute an hors d’oeuvre for a really square teutonic meal later
on.” Moreover, Phipps warned that Germany would inevitably establish
“air and submarine bases” in the colonies, posing a threat to english in-
terests. He had been told by Minister of economics Hjalmar schacht that
Germany would send Nazi extremists to “future German colonies,” and
Phipps feared that these “gentry would not be very agreeable neighbors,
nor would they be likely to be overly squeamish in their treatment of the
unfortunate natives.” any concessions to Germany on the colonial ques-
tion, Phipps warned in summing up his position, would “merely whet the
German appetite, increase German prestige and strength and ultimately . . .
render more probable an anglo-German conflict.” 84
repeatedly Phipps made the point that Hitler held ultimate power
within the Nazi movement and that his authority could not be challenged.
today such a view may seem to be so obvious as to be dismissed as trite.
But for a few years after the Nazis took over, numerous reports and rumors
circulated about sharp divisions between moderates and radicals that were
likely to lead to serious conflicts within the movement. For example, early
in 1934 Consul General Gainer, stationed in Munich, contended that “the
danger of . . . a split is now a real one.” to be sure, over the years there had
85
been differences within the Nazi Party, and in 1932 a split seemed possible,