Page 65 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

52 The British Diplomats

But it also became increasingly evident that Macdonald was slowly
slipping into senility. Under the circumstances, stanley Baldwin, who had
twice led a Conservative government during the 1920s and now held the
position of lord President of the (Privy) Council, became the de facto
prime minister, and in 1935, after Macdonald’s resignation, he again as-
sumed that office. By all accounts, Baldwin was an intelligent man and a
shrewd politician with an excessive yearning for public affection. He was
not the kind of leader who would inaugurate a foreign policy that did not
enjoy wide support among the British electorate.
His views on foreign affairs were rather complicated, so much so that
he could not pursue a firm policy. Baldwin did not admire Fascism or Na-
zism, but, like most tories, he considered Communism an even greater evil
that must be confronted by Western democracies. in 1936, he indicated that
he would not find it regrettable if the “Bolshies and Nazis” fought each
other. despite his disapproval of Nazism, he could not decide—as noted
in the introduction—whether Hitler was committed to peace or intended
to go to war to conquer territories in eastern europe. His recent biogra-
pher, Philip Williamson, considered Baldwin’s uncertainty understandable
because it “was difficult to obtain accurate and agreed estimates of the scale
and speed of German production,” a judgment that is not consistent with
the reports provided by British diplomats and military experts posted in
Germany, as this study makes clear. it would be more plausible to conclude
that Baldwin’s puzzlement about Nazism flowed from his deeply held con-
victions. He believed that universal disarmament was desirable and feasible
and—as he privately noted—that the treaty of Versailles was “iniquitous.”
Nevertheless, late in 1933 he accepted the cabinet’s view that a modest de-
gree of rearmament was called for. But naïveté remained the hallmark of his
foreign policy. He never gave up his belief that agreement with Hitler on
international issues might be achieved. in the winter of 1933–34 he seriously
contemplated visiting Hitler to iron out differences. However, sir John
simon, the foreign secretary, and anthony eden, the undersecretary of for-
eign affairs, persuaded him to abandon the plan on the grounds that such a
trip to Germany would strengthen the Führer at home and dismay friendly
governments in europe, which already harbored doubts about Britain’s
commitment to resisting Germany’s aggressiveness. even after Germany’s
march into the rhineland early in 1936, Baldwin thought that Hitler might
now be content and that he would jettison any further plans of expansion.
Once again, Baldwin thought of visiting Hitler, and once again members
of his cabinet persuaded him that it was a bad idea. 94