Page 68 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The British Diplomats 55

On May 16, 1933, he distributed a detailed memorandum he had written
on rumbold’s famous dispatch, which he had previously sent to all cabinet
members. On the same day, he also passed on to the cabinet an “enclosure”
written by Major-General a. C. temperley, Britain’s military representative
at the disarmament conference in Geneva, whose views were very much
in harmony with those of rumbold. it is evident that simon distributed
temperley’s report because he endorsed it.
the most striking feature of simon’s memorandum and the enclosure
is that in addition to accepting the ambassador’s assessments of Hitlerism,
they put forward proposals for firm measures against Nazi Germany that
were less qualified than those of rumbold. simon appeared to be more
convinced than the ambassador that Hitler had embarked on a path bound
to lead to military conflict. the difference between them may have been
one of emphasis, but it was nevertheless noteworthy.
simon began his analysis of rumbold’s document by stressing the
ambassador’s description of Germany’s vast program of remilitarization,
which started with young boys aged twelve. “thus the spirit of the moment
is definitely disquieting,” simon wrote, “and the Government of Germany,
for the first time since the war, are giving state sanction and encourage-
ment to any attitude of mind, as well as to various forms of military train-
ing which can end in only one way.” simon conceded that Hitler’s regime
might collapse or that a peaceful resolution of outstanding differences
might be achieved, but he focused on the possibility, which he considered
most likely, that Hitler would succeed in realizing his program and that a
european war would break out “in four or five years’ time.” simon quoted
the German foreign minister, Neurath, and the vice chancellor, Papen, to
the effect that Germany would not shrink from resorting to force to attain
its goals. “Germans must explain,” Papen had declared, “why they have re-
moved the word ‘pacifism’ from their vocabulary, and prove that the anti-
pacifist campaign is not synonymous with warlike intentions.” this sort
of “organized Nazi propaganda,” simon stressed, was now standard fare
in Germany. He warned that German leaders had their eyes set on the an-
nexation of danzig, austria, and the saar region. Moreover, the foreign
minister found it “difficult . . . to continue to assume that the German Gov-
ernment still intend to achieve equality of status by legal methods and in
stages to be settled by international agreement.”
in response to this threat, the British government “should consider all
possible contingencies.” Western countries should turn to the league of
Nations for help in containing German aggressiveness, but if that failed,