Page 73 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

60 The British Diplomats

simon’s change of policy was the result of his confusion over “what to do
next” with regard to Germany, and he may well have been right. 110 in a
report to the cabinet on July 14, 1933, simon admitted as much. during a
discussion of Germany’s disregard of the disarmament clauses in the treaty
of Versailles he confessed that “i have not found it easy to reach a view of
my own as to what should be done.” interestingly, he thought that “public
opinion” in Britain was then “so roused by Germany’s internal policy that it
will not tolerate the idea of German rearmament.” Of course, he made this
statement before the peace movement had been fully mobilized. and he
himself tended to play down the immediate danger of Nazism by predict-
ing confidently that Germany would not be “ready to take violent action
for years to come.” 111
in February 1934, eden, the second in command at the Foreign Of-
fice, left for Germany to meet with the Führer and his senior lieutenants
to find out whether some agreement could be reached on outstanding is-
sues. although there were no major breakthroughs, eden’s impressions of
the dictator were far more favorable than those of rumbold and Phipps.
remarkably protean, Hitler cast off the angry persona that had rattled the
ambassadors and in eden’s presence adopted the demeanor of a reason-
able statesman. the ploy worked. the Führer struck the undersecretary as
“much more than a demagogue. He knew what he was speaking about
and, as the long interviews proceeded, showed himself complete master
of his subject.” He was at all times “restrained and friendly.” to his wife,
eden confided, “dare i confess it? i rather liked him.” and in a letter to
Prime Minister Baldwin, he wrote: “Poor Man . . . he was badly gassed by
us and was blind in consequence for three months.” 112 eden’s discussions
with Hitler focused on what were by now the usual topics: the withdrawal
of Germany from the league of Nations, its insistence on maintaining the
paramilitary organizations (the ss and sa), and the government’s program
of rearmament in general. eden was pleased that the Führer had made one
concession: he promised that if agreements were reached on other issues,
he would see to it that in the future the ss and the sa would not be permit-
ted to carry arms or receive training from army officers. eden had not yet
learned that Hitler’s promises were meaningless. 113
thirteen months later, in March 1935, eden accompanied simon on a
visit to Hitler, and this time eden’s reaction to the dictator was distinctly
negative, leading him to conclude that the “future looked ominous.” in
his diary, he noted that the results of the discussions were “bad . . . whole
tone and temper very different to a year ago, rearmed and rearming with