Page 74 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

The British Diplomats 61

the old Prussian spirit very much in evidence. russia is now the bogey.”
His unfavorable view of Hitler was shared by andré François-Poncet, the
French ambassador. at a dinner party in Berlin, eden remarked that it was
now seventeen years to the day since the last major offensive by the German
army in World War i began. Hitler’s interest was piqued and he began a
discussion with eden about that crucial battle; it turned out that both eden
and Hitler had fought in it. after dinner, François-Poncet, who had heard
this conversation, approached eden and asked him whether it was true that
“you were opposite Hitler.” When eden responded yes, the Frenchman
exclaimed: “et vous l’avez manqué? Vous devriez être fusillé.” [and you
missed him? You should be shot.] 114
the substantive discussions with Hitler on current issues stretched
over two days and led nowhere. One of the Führer’s comments was as far-
fetched—or as eden put it, as “ridiculous”—as those he had occasionally
made to rumbold and Phipps, who had duly reported them to the For-
eign Office. the topic under discussion was the paramilitary groups. Hitler
“poo-poohed their significance” and claimed that foreign countries main-
tained similar institutions where youths were trained to use rifles; he specif-
ically mentioned eton, the school eden had attended. eden “laughed” and
pointed out that the Officers’ training Corps “were not taken so seriously.
For many boys they were the occasion for smoking on field days.” the Brit-
ish diplomat appealed to Neurath for some statement of support, but “he
was silent.” and Hitler simply “shook his head, completely unconvinced.”
eden further protested the Führer’s claim that the english public schools
were designed to produce paramilitary organizations and that therefore
Germany should be permitted to have similar programs. But “my protests
were disregarded as patriotic deception.” eden confessed that his optimism
of a year earlier had been misplaced. Hitler’s unyielding demands for the
enlargement of the German military forces made “an agreement impos-
sible.” 115
simon, too, left Germany pessimistic about europe’s future. He feared
that the situation was “pretty hopeless.” europe might still take steps to
calm the waters, but he believed that even this “may not prevent an ultimate
explosion”; it could only “delay it.” 116
By this time, the failure of British political leaders to rein in Hitler was
clearly not the result of ignorance of the Führer’s political agenda; rather,
the leaders—as well as the people at large—were gripped by a stultify-
ing lack of political will, which in turn resulted in part from a misunder-
standing of the balance of power in europe. When rumbold and Phipps