Page 69 - Was Hitler a Riddle?

56 The British Diplomats

Britain, France, and the United states should issue a warning to Hitler not
to embark on a “policy of open defiance.” simon was not optimistic that
such an appeal would prove effective.
the enclosure by temperley that simon appended to his discussion of
rumbold’s dispatch bluntly characterized the transformation that Germany
had undergone during the three and a half months of Hitler’s rule. temper-
ley referred to the “orgy of military parades,” the ceaseless propaganda by
the Nazis and by “Hitler himself,” and the brutality of the regime. “Hitler
has been swiftly consolidating his position. On the political side, he has
imprisoned a sufficient number of his political opponents to get the reich-
stag to vote its own temporary extinction. He has successfully abolished the
rights of all German states and put Nazi Commissioners in charge. in Prus-
sia Göring has been installed as commissioner, the appointment carrying
with it the all-important control of the police. He is Hitler’s chief lieutenant
and is spoken of as the most violent, the most stupid and most reckless of
his entourage. . . . the whole country has been Hitlerised.”
temperley considered it a fatal mistake for the British government to
ignore the political changes in Germany. He warned that the “warlike spirit
is being openly roused to a fever heat against the Poles as the first objec-
tive, with France as the ultimate enemy.” the arguments in favor of univer-
sal disarmament struck him as sheer folly, since Hitler would never abide
by any such arrangement. He advised his colleagues in the government
to heed the advice “of the old ironsides’ motto of ‘trust in God and keep
your powder dry.’” temperley proposed that France, the United states, and
Britain issue a “stern warning to Germany that there can be no disarma-
ment, no equality of status and relaxation of the treaty of Versailles un-
less a complete reversion of present military preparations and tendencies
takes place in Germany.” temperley acknowledged that such a stand by the
three powers would “provoke a crisis and [that] the danger of war will be
brought appreciably nearer.” this prospect did not faze him, because, as he
put it, “Germany knows that she cannot fight at present and we must call
her bluff. she is powerless before the French army and our fleet. Hitler,
for all his bombast, must give way.” temperley predicted that if his advice
was not taken, Germany would continue its present policies, making war
“inevitable” in five years under conditions far more favorable to Germany
because by then it would have built up a powerful military force. the en-
closure ended with the following argument in favor of a hard-line policy:
“there is a mad dog abroad once more, and we must resolutely combine
either to secure its destruction or at least its confinement until the disease