Page 63 - Was Hitler a Riddle?
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50  The British Diplomats

              even to attempt to reach agreement with it. On the contrary, a show of
              force by Germany could be very effective. the extremists believed that “it
              would be only necessary to drop a couple of bombs on london to bring
              His Majesty’s Government to reason in regard to the colonial question.” 90
                Phipps was convinced that Hitler saw no reason to abandon his three
              principal goals: the annexation of austria and other territories with large
              German populations, most notably parts of Czechoslovakia; expansion in
              eastern europe; and recovery of colonies lost at the end of World War i. But
              even after Germany had achieved these goals, the appetite of Nazi leaders
              would probably not be satiated. “to-day Germany is strong, the achieve-
              ments of the last four years are stupendous and there seems no reason to
              set a limit to German ambitions.” in the course of a private conversation
              with the British military attaché, an officer of the German General staff
              had recently offered his opinion that Germany could only begin to form a
              real colonial empire after consolidating its position in europe; this meant
              possession of the Netherlands and access to the adriatic at trieste, both
              of which, he declared, were “formerly Germanic.” in military circles, such
              grand schemes of expansion were not rare. 91
                Moreover, many Germans were disgruntled over what they perceived to
              be their country’s place in the world, which may have resulted from its late
              appearance on the historical scene. Germany, these people believed, had
              not received its “fair share of the good things in this world. to make mat-
              ters worse, . . . [the Nazis] have embarked on an experiment in autarchy
              and in new-fangled political ideas which subordinate business to party con-
              siderations, with the result that a primitive, credulous and docile people,
              [has] almost implicit faith in their present leaders . . . . [Germany had a
              brief period of democratic rule in the 1920s.] Unfortunately for human-
              ity, this country is again in the hands of an arbitrary authority. indeed, the
              imperial regime was liberal and democratic compared to the regime to-day.
              is there any remedy for the present state of affairs? is there anything that
              any outside agency can do to improve the situation, to ward off the risk of
              an ultimate explosion?” Phipps’s answer was that the Germans could be
              deterred from their dangerous course if they “feel the chill air of isolation
              blowing about their ears.” european countries should collaborate and, to-
              gether with the United states, pursue the following course: they should
              categorically refuse to pander to German threats and there should be no
              “slackening of our rearmament.” Finally, Western countries should retain
              the “closest” friendship with France. Phipps placed special emphasis on in-
              volving the United states in the effort to isolate Germany. 92
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