Page 88 - Air Forces Monthly - September 2017
P. 88

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             Strong tailwind caused




             F-35A engine fire








































              Above: The upper rear fuselage of F-35A 12-5052 following its engine fire on September 23, 2016, at Mountain Home AFB.  USAF
              A STRONG tailwind has been   significant fire damage.  The   20 seconds after initial visual   up earlier.  The fire’s ferocity
              confirmed as the cause of   report says that while total   indications of the problem.  and close proximity impaired
              the engine fire that seriously   costs resulting from this mishap   The fire damaged the engine   the pilot’s ability to follow the
              damaged a US Air Force F-35A   have still to be determined,   exhaust nozzle, landing gear   checklist.  In the necessary haste
              Lightning II during start-up at   damage is estimated to   surfaces and components in   to exit the burning aircraft,
              Mountain Home Air Force Base,   be in excess of $17m.  both the left and right main   he failed to move the engine
              Idaho, on September 23, 2016,   The Accident Investigation   undercarriage wheel wells.  As   switch to off, in accordance with
              see Attrition, November 2016,   Board (AIB) President found, by a  both weapon bay doors were   the egress checklist, before
              p92.  An Air Education and   preponderance of the evidence,   open, flames penetrated both   leaving the cockpit.  Had he
              Training Command (AETC) Aircraft  that the cause of the mishap   bays.  The outer surface of the   done so at the first indication
              Accident Investigation Report   was the direct tailwind present   aircraft on the aft two thirds of   of fire, fuel would have been
              into the incident was released on   during engine start.  Wind   the airframe’s centre fuselage   shut off from the engine almost
              July 12.  It identifies the aircraft   sensors on the airfield indicate   suffered varying degrees of   immediately and the fire would
              as 12-5052, assigned to the 61st   that a wind speed of 30kts or   damage.  Some minor damage   not have been so fierce.  The
              Fighter Squadron ‘Top Dogs’,   greater was present during this   was even noted on surfaces   report accepts, however, that
              from the 56th Fighter Wing at   process.  This forced hot air into   forward of the cockpit.  prioritising egress was necessary
              Luke Air Force Base, Arizona.    the inlet of the Integrated Power   The report notes that neither   due to the imminent danger.
              The aircraft was temporarily   Pack (IPP), which led to a series   publications nor training were   Procedural guidance,
              deployed to Mountain Home   of events resulting in insufficient   adequate for the circumstances   publications and checklist
              along with six other F-35As from   torque applied to the aircraft   surrounding this incident.  IPP   error were thus determined
              September 10-24 for training.  engine during start, causing   and engine start issues with a   to be substantial contributing
              At approximately 0852hrs   rotation speed to slow.  At the   tailwind were known prior to this  factors to the overall extent
              the aircraft experienced an   same time, fuel continued to   incident, however, publications   of damage.  AETC stated that
              uncontained engine fire during   be supplied to the engine at an   were written and communicated   fixes and checklist revisions
              start.  The start-up was aborted   increasing rate, which triggered   in such a way that the F-35A   have already been put into
              and the pilot safely egressed   an uncontained fire in the   pilot community only had a   place to prevent further
              the still-burning aircraft,   unit.  This spread out from the   vague awareness of the potential  such incidents.  This includes
              suffering only minor burns to   engine exhaust and was carried   issue.  Evidence shows that if   implementing a maximum 20kt
              his head.  Maintenance crew   along the outer surfaces of the   the pilot had expected problems   tailwind limit for engine start
              members responded and     aircraft by the tailwind, causing   with the tailwind, he may have   on the F-35 and adding more
              extinguished the fire.  The rear   significant damage.  The fire   relied less on automation and   robust engine start and pilot
              portion of the aircraft sustained   was extinguished approximately   identified the abnormal start-  emergency departure training.



              88 // SEPTEMBER 2017 #354                                                             www.airforcesmonthly.com
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