Page 37 - Gi flipbook April 2018
P. 37

FIGURE A: Outline indicates the geographical area supplied gas from Glenmavis  FIGURE B: Digital representation of a
                                                                                   Mokveld FCV














                                                                                   FIGURE C: Image of the Mokveld valve at
                                                                                   Glenmavis















                   The travel indicator allows the   and the potential implications of such
                 engineer on site to view the status of   a failure, an emergency repair was
                 the valve’s position during operation,   required in order to minimise any
                 testing or maintenance. This has   possible disruption to a major supply.   FIGURE D: Indication percentages used for
                 proven to be particularly useful during  (See Figure D)           the purpose of a valve travel test
                 a telemetry fault where gas control
                 could potentially have no visual   What happened next?                  Fully                Fully
                 confirmation of the valve’s position or   We contacted Mokveld and requested   100% = Open  75% - 50% - 25%  0% =  Closed
                 operational status.              assistance from a technician who, in
                 The valve body contains a        order to help, would have to travel
                 mechanically-operated valve seat,   directly from their headquarters in
                 which serves as the primary control   Gouda, Holland.             FIGURE E: The Mokveld FCV being
                 element over the volume of gas     Prior to the arrival of the technician,   prepared for repair
                 entering the offtake pressure    preparations were completed on site
                 reduction station. (See Figure C)  ahead of the repair process. An
                                                  emergency non-routine operation
                 FAILURE OF A MOKVELD             (NRO) was prepared; the valve was
                 VOLUMETRIC FLOW VALVE            isolated, decommissioned, removed
                 Part of the Mokveld valve        from the inlet pipeline and placed in a
                 maintenance schedule is a ‘travel test’.   designated work area. (See Figure E)
                 This is carried out by our electrical
                 and instrumentation (E&I) technicians   What caused the valve to fail?
                 in collaboration with gas control, who   There were a number of factors
                 are responsible for monitoring our   which contributed to the valve
                 network’s transmission telemetry and   failure. Evidence of damage to the
                 alarm systems.                   valve seat was apparent, which we
                   The valve seat and chamber     later discovered was a result of dry   INVESTIGATION
                 capacity is calibrated and positioned   grease deposits and small metal   From the evidence found within the
                 through stages.                  debris passing downstream into the   valve itself, we had to establish just
                   During a routine travel test, the   valve chamber.              how dry grease deposits and metal
                 valve reached its fully closed position   I was informed by the Mokveld   debris were able to escape through
                 at zero per cent. This was confirmed   technician that, despite the valve’s   the site inlet filter system and travel
                 by E&I, who then instructed gas   operational capabilities on a high   downstream.
                 control to start the re-opening   pressure gas installation, it is simply   After an investigation, two separate
                 process. Almost immediately, there   not designed to pass any type of   causes were identified that we believe
                 was a fault alarm indicating the valve   foreign or solid debris other than its   contributed to the valve failure.
                 was not responding and subsequently   design profile of natural gas.    We inspected the site inlet filters
                 failed to re-open. Given the criticality   (See Figure F)         where a large mixture of metal debris,



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        IGEMNews_YPPC.indd   2                                                                                    15/03/2018   13:50
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