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Mopti region and northern half of Segou region: HIGH
There is a credible risk of rebel incursions or attacks on government or security force targets in Mopti and Segou regions, with the latter's northern half particularly
exposed. Due to the region's proximity to areas where Islamist militants are present, foreign personnel also face a credible risk of kidnap-for-ransom. Due to this, we
advise against all but essential travel to Mopti region and to areas located north of the Niger river in Segou region.
Border with Mauritania: HIGH
The border is porous, making this area vulnerable to incursions by Islamist militants intent on kidnapping foreign personnel. We advise against all but essential travel to
areas located within 60 miles (100km) of the border, which requires adopting stringent security precautions.
Personal Risk

CRIME
The crime level is the highest in the capital Bamako, but violent crime remains rare. Pickpocketing and petty theft are the crimes most likely to affect foreign personnel.
Personnel should make an effort to park vehicles in secure areas and avoid road travel after dark to minimise the risk of carjacking. Precautions should be taken if using
local internet cafés to avoid falling victim to scams. Incidents of highway banditry have been reported in the vicinity of the western border with Guinea.
Criminal activity as a result of localised inter-communal and political violence does not directly target foreigners, though incidental exposure to such acts in the central
and northern regions cannot be ruled out.
TERRORISM
There is a risk of terrorist attacks by Islamist militants against military and/or foreign targets in Mali. While such activity was until 2015 mostly concentrated in northern
desert regions – Gao, Kidal, Menaka, Taoudeni and Timbuktu – which carry an EXTREME travel risk rating and where Sahel-based militants enjoy greater freedom of
movement due to local lawlessness and a weak state presence, the risk has since expanded southwards, including in the capital Bamako where several attacks have
taken place. Potential targets for further attacks by militants include symbols of the Western presence in the country, including diplomatic missions and hotels, as well as
venues known to be frequented by foreigners.
In August 2015, gunmen attacked a former hotel in Sévaré, east of Mopti, housing foreigners mostly working for the UN Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), while
another, similar attack involving the use of explosives and firearms occurred in February 2016 in Timbuktu city at a former hotel used as a base by MINUSMA. The UN
force remains among the key targets of attacks by Islamist militant groups in the country.
On 18 June 2017, four gunmen raided a resort in Yirimadio (Koulikoro region), nine miles (15km) east of the capital Bamako; five people were killed and several others
injured in the assault. The newly formed jihadist alliance Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin, loyal to AQIM, claimed responsibility for the attack. The militants have vowed to
continue to focus on Western ‘crusaders' and their allies and on increasing support among Muslims by avoiding indiscriminately targeted attacks.
Moreover, 2016-17 also saw a series of attacks on security posts in Segou, Mopti, and – to a lesser extent – Koulikoro and Sikasso regions, suggesting that militant
activity and instability from the desert north are increasingly spreading to central and southern regions, where militant groups and a growing number of local self-defence
militias have capitalised on the state's declining legitimacy in the locals' eyes and dissatisfaction with the government to extend their influence.
KIDNAPPING
There is little risk of kidnapping for business travellers and expatriates in southern urban areas, including in the capital Bamako. However, the presence in northern and,
more recently, central regions of Islamist militants has increased the risk of such incidents occurring not only in those areas but also in adjacent regions where militants
have carried out hit-and-run incursions to kidnap foreigners. The militants are also believed to be able to outsource the interception of foreigners to accomplices such as
local traffickers and other gunmen who are familiar with smuggling routes in the region.
Security precautions are therefore necessary anywhere within easy reach of mobile groups of northern-based armed militants: Mopti region and parts of Ségou region
located north of the Niger river, and areas located north of the RN1in the western Kayes region, near the Mauritanian border. We also advise against all travel in the area
bordering Mauritania (within 60 miles (100km) of the border).
Several kidnappings followed the rebel takeover of northern regions in April 2012. Seven Algerian diplomats were abducted in Gao after a raid on their consulate, an
incident for which the Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJAO) claimed responsibility. Separately, a Swiss national was kidnapped for the second time in
January 2016 in Timbuktu, AQIM has claimed responsibility. MUJAO also claimed responsibility for the November 2012 kidnapping of a French national in Diéma (Kayes
region), around 70 miles (110km) south of the Mauritania border. In December 2016, a French NGO worker who had been living in Mali for 15 years was kidnapped by
armed men in Gao city. The February 2017 kidnapping of a Colombian nun by unidentified armed men in the southern town of Karangasso (Sikasso) further illustrates
the growing reach of such groups southwards, in regions that remain neglected as military efforts are still focused on the north. This points to the continued potential for
abductions of foreigners, with expatriates or foreigners on long missions particularly at risk.
SOCIAL UNREST
Protests and strikes by students and unions occasionally take place in Bamako. While these remain relatively rare, they should be avoided because the security forces
are likely to disperse crowds using heavy-handed measures. Protests tend to increase at times of exacerbated socio-political tension, notably during periods of political
instability or during electoral campaigns.
Inter-ethnic violence between the Fulani and Bambara communities is also relatively common in central areas, such as in Segou region, where the Bambara accuse the
Fulanis of colluding with northern-based Islamic militants. Foreigners are unlikely to be targeted in such violence, but bystanders could face incidental exposure to unrest.
BUSINESSWOMEN
Society is male-dominated and Western businesswomen may find some attitudes irritating, if not offensive. Senior female executives may find that their local
(predominantly male) counterparts do not take them seriously in business negotiations and that time is wasted in establishing authority.
Foreign women may elicit unwanted attention in the capital Bamako, particularly if walking alone. Mali is a predominantly Muslim country and female visitors should dress
conservatively. Female visitors do not face specific risks but commonsense security precautions apply.
CONFLICT
A peace agreement in 1996 put an end to an ethnic-Tuareg rebellion in the north-east, centred on Kidal region. However, Tuareg frustration fuelled by perceived neglect
of the region by the authorities, attempts by the government to reassert military control in the region and an influx of demobilised Tuareg combatants from Libya
contributed to the resurgence, in late 2011, of the Tuareg separatist movement. This has occurred with the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA)
claiming independence for a Tuareg homeland (Azawad) comprising Gao, Kidal, Menaka, Taoudeni and Timbuktu regions.
The MNLA, after forming an opportunistic alliance with the domestic Islamist rebel group Ansar Dine, in mid-January 2012 attacked military positions in the north. Facing
little resistance from an ill-equipped and demoralised military, and aided by a coup in March 2012, the MNLA captured Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, effectively partitioning
the country in April 2012. The MNLA proclaimed the independence of the ‘Azawad', which was rejected by the international community.
However, the ethnic-Tuareg group was quickly supplanted by the Islamist militants who took control of all three regions and the MNLA, from its weakened position,
eventually relinquished its claims to independence. Other Islamist militant groups present in northern Mali include the transnational al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and Al Murabitun.
In January 2013, Ansar Dine announced it was ending a ceasefire and shortly afterwards seized a locality in Mopti region. President Dioncounda Traoré appealed to
France for military support to stop the militants' southward advance and French troops in January 2013 launched a full-fledged ground intervention. The initiative
accelerated the UN-sanctioned mobilisation of a regional military force (MINUSMA). Islamist militants have dispersed and launched a guerrilla-style campaign involving
attacks, including suicide bombings, on military targets in the northern regions.
A peace accord signed in June 2015 between some northern armed groups under the umbrella of the Co-ordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) and the government
has not yet put an end to this instability. Sporadic fighting persists, as the government seeks to re-establish its grip on the north, while armed groups use the opportunity
of the ceasefire to strengthen their local power.