Page 48 - CHIRP annual digest 2016.pdf

CHIRP Maritime

showed common factors are incorrect cargo line-up, engine room was evacuated. Upon investigation in the
inadequate ship/shore communication, and inadequate CO room it was noted that the pilot operated section
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supervision. valve was in open position. After depressurisation, this was
closed manually.
Another incident occurred during a topping–off operation
on a tanker where communication with the terminal Lessons to be learnt
failed. The O-rings of the valve assembly had become brittle,

Finally, whilst discharging, the manifold watch heard a causing a leak to develop from the pilot cylinder. In
change of flow and also observed a pressure increase, addition, ball valves in the fire station were found to be
immediately reporting this to the Cargo Control Room. leaking. This led to the activation of the CO . It was
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The Officer of the Watch simultaneously noted an increase subsequently determined that the control valves of the
in pressure and suspended the discharge. The terminal pilot cylinder had not been inspected during an annual
informed the vessel that the pressure increase was due to service, that the ball valves had never been pressure
an uncontrolled closing of an automatic shore line valve. tested, and that the pilot lines had never been blown
through.
Lessons to be learnt
Any pressure surge carries a high risk of causing damage CHIRP Suggests
to a pipeline and pollution. The CHIRPMaritime Advisory Board highlighted that heat,
humidity and time will degrade systems. Manufacturers
Cargo operations should be monitored closely and should take this into account in the maintenance sections
effectively, with any change in flow pressure being reported of their manuals, highlighting guidance on contractor and
and investigated. If any doubt exists, transfer rates should ship staff maintenance periodicities. Similarly, planned
be reduced or transfers suspended until the causes are maintenance systems on board should be robust and
investigated and obviated. comprehensive. For more modern systems, the increasing

Personnel involved in cargo operations should be fully use of technology calls for specialist skills; these may be
aware of cargo line-up, tank changeover and blowing- costly or in short supply. The UK Marine Accident Investi -
through procedures. gation Branch has encountered incidents of this type in the
past.
Communications between all participants including
terminals should be pre-tested and are vital at all times, CHIRP has also received a separate report of an in -
particularly at critical stages of an operation such as spection during which manufacturers’ locking pins were
topping off. still in place on the whole CO system which was thus
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rendered ineffective.
CHIRP Suggests
“Least used, most needed”. When a fire, flood, person
Full compliance with the ISGOTT ship shore safety
checklist including repeat checks where required are overboard, or other major emergency occurs, the imme -
diate response systems must work immediately, first
important, as are thorough cargo planning and under -
standing of the planned operation by all personnel. time. There is no room for failure or delay. This account of
a CO system in non-operational condition amounts to a
Procedures for any valve manipulation should be checked 2
prior to operation, and a responsible officer should serious threat to life. The implications for installation,
maintenance and system knowledge are clear.
double check cargo valve settings before starting/
restarting of cargo operations. The above article was published in MFB 44
The above article was published in MFB43
Article. 38
Engineering Mishaps
Article. 37 What did the reporters tell us?
Accidental Release of CO to an
2 In REPORT 1: During a new build sea trial, the low level
Engine Room. alarm of a main engine lubrication oil sump tank sounded;

At midnight, during engineer handover, the main engine yard staff noticed that 5-8m3 of oil had been lost. It was
auxiliary blower fault alarm and a CO high pressure alarm found that incomplete actuation of a 3-way valve at the
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activated. CO had been released and was visible; the oil purifier inlet was to blame for a slow but continuous
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