Page 58 - CHIRP annual digest 2016.pdf

CHIRP Maritime

The lessons to be learnt which was underway at slow speed. He was then recovered
Reporter stated; Main lesson learned was to make on board; the vessel departed.
contact with a vessel with unclear intentions earlier.
CHIRP regrets that despite phone calls made and
emails sent, the ship managers failed to respond. The
car carrier’s OOW response to the VHF call is indicative
of a poor safety culture onboard. The report is a good
example of where the use of VHF might not have
worked earlier, because since the OOW’s response was
poor when the vessels were close to each other, it is Note man on starboard platform
likely to have been poor when the ships were several
miles apart. What did the vessel’s management tell us?
The vessel’s management were grateful that CHIRP had
CHIRP Suggests forwarded the report, and outlined a reactive process of
CHIRP does not accept the reporter’s lesson learned which the aim is to ensure that health and safety aware -
relating to the use of VHF and does not encourage the use ness is improved onboard, that such unnecessary risks are
of VHF for collision avoidance purposes. CHIRP believes not taken in future, and that a comprehensive drill is in
the yacht would have benefited from the use of an AIS place in the event of future fouled anchors.
transponder.
The lessons learnt
This appears to be a speed management issue for the car The day was sunny; the conditions fair. Obviously a
carrier arriving too early for the pilot. The ship was most fouled anchor was not in the plan; so it is easy to
likely in a ‘holding pattern’ and would have benefited visualise a quick reaction to the situation without
from enhanced Bridge Resource Management, thereby proper safety arrangements in place.
avoiding the apparent loss of situation awareness.
The hazards are clear. A particularly serious one is
See also the MAIB report into the grounding of the Pride entanglement in the fouled line while the man was
of Canterbury “The Downs” – off Deal, Kent 31 January attempting to clear it from the anchor to which he
2008. himself was clinging. It is not obvious whether the line
The above article was published in MFB45 was under tension or whether it was light or heavy.
However a sudden increase or release in tension could
have had the man trapped under water or potentially
Article. 51 towed astern near the propellers. The vessel was
A Fouled Anchor operating propulsion at the time. It is not clear whether
A superyacht, while weighing, found her anchor fouled. the man on the anchor was continuously supervised or
While she was operating propulsion at very slow speed, a not. He certainly should have been; it is very unlikely
crew member jumped into the water, climbed onto the that he was visible from the bridge. He was not wearing
anchor to clear the fouled line, and was then recovered as a life jacket and did not have a lifeline/harness other
the yacht gathered way. than the line onto which it is reported he was hanging.
These are severe safety lapses.
What did the reporter tell us? All was well, but it might not have been: a classic near
A crew member was seen on the starboard side standing
miss in a realm of seafaring where the relatively relaxed
on a ledge just above the waterline with no lifejacket or routines of recreational boating in good weather can
safety harness visible; he was hanging on to a single line
start to dilute the procedures necessary in larger vessels.
from above. He balanced there for some time, before Was an operational risk assessment undertaken?
jumping into the sea and swimming up to the bow. He
then climbed onto the anchor. The foredeck crew then The vessel’s management has responded positively to
continued raising the anchor whilst the man was busily CHIRP; their comments are welcome. They outline a
working to clear the fouled rope. comprehensive procedure which will be employed in
Once he had cleared the anchor, he jumped back into the future cases of fouled anchors. This procedure will
sea, drifting back down the starboard side of the yacht include provision of a rescue boat (all crew donning life

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