Page 251 - Leadership in the Indian Army

In August 1959, Prem was posted to Army HQ as Director, Military
Intelligence (DMI). At this time, Thimayya was the Army Chief and
Krishna Menon the Defence Minister. Though his appointment was at

Thimayya’s behest, Prem soon found that he had little say in the higher
echelons of power. Military intelligence had been devalued over the years
and civilian intelligence agencies, particularly the Intelligence Bureau (IB),
called the shots. The situation was not improved by the presence of B.N.
Mullick, the Director of the IB, and B.M. Kaul, the QMG, who became the
CGS after Thimayya’s retirement in 1961. Both Kaul and Mullick were
powerful men, and had the ear of the Prime Minister.

Soon after his arrival in Delhi, Prem was a mute witness to the chain of
events that resulted in Thimayya’s resignation and its subsequent
withdrawal. Prem and Mohini had known ‘Timmy’ and Nina for several
years, and were frequent visitors to White Gates, Thimayya’s official
residence. They were shocked and deeply hurt by the change it brought
about in Thimayya, who withdrew into a shell. He was no longer the

irrepressible Timmy who could raise everyone’s spirits by his very
presence. More than his low morale, what worried Prem was the gradual
erosion of his authority and the creation of new power centres in Army HQ,
which did not bode well for the army.
Within a fortnight of his taking over as DMI, Prem produced a 30-page
appreciation, highlighting the threat from the Chinese and making specific
recommendations regarding deployment of troops, strengthening the

intelligence set-up, and improving communications in the north-east. At
that time, his recommendations were not given any serious consideration,
but as later events were to prove, he was correct in his assessment.
In October 1959, a border incident took place in Ladakh, in which a
police party led by Karam Singh of the IB was fired upon by the Chinese
and 10 policemen were killed. Karam Singh and several others were taken

prisoner. There was an outcry in Parliament, accompained by a demand for
more effective security measures at the border, which at that time was
controlled by the IB under the Home Ministry. The Prime Minister played
down the incident, saying that ‘not a blade of grass’ grows in the region,
conveying the impression that the area was of no importance. The
opposition was quick to catch on to this phrase, and grilled Nehru for his
unfortunate choice of words.