Page 254 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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During his stint at the IMA, Prem had to perform another task which was
to have wide-ranging repercussions. After the 1962 debacle in NEFA, there
was a public outcry at the humiliation suffered by the nation, and Prime
Minister Nehru agreed to institute an enquiry. The NEFA Enquiry, as it
came to be known, was to be headed by Lieutenant General Henderson-
Brooks, who was then GOC 11 Corps at Jullunder. Prem Bhagat was to be
the sole member, and in January 1963 was attached as Brigadier General
Staff to Headquarters 11 Corps for this purpose. During the next three
months, he travelled extensively to the areas where the operations had taken
place. He met hundreds of officers, JCOs and men to get a first-hand
account of the events that had taken place. He also had to study thousands
of operational orders and instructions, war diaries and other documents to
piece the story together.
The Enquiry Report was submitted to the COAS on 12 May 1963, and he
in turn forwarded it to the Defence Minister on 2 July 1963. Though it had
been ordered by the Army Chief, the Ministry of Defence decided that its
contents should not be made public, and it was graded ‘Top Secret’. This
was probably because it showed certain failings on the part of Nehru,
Krishna Menon and a few others in the government, as well as the army.
However, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan made a statement in Parliament on
2 September 1963, in which he referred to certain portions of the report and
its recommendations.
The four specific terms of reference which the enquiry had been asked to
examine were shortcomings in training and equipment; system of
command; physical fitness of troops; and capacity of commanders at all
levels to influence the men under them. The enquiry decided to include
three other points pertaining to operational aspects in order to come up with
a more comprehensive picture. It thus also covered intelligence; staff work
and procedures; and the higher direction of operations. Though the report
was never made public, Neville Maxwell was somehow able to lay his
hands on it, and he has written about it in his book, India’s China War.
Prem’s exposure to the real story of the NEFA debacle had a profound
effect on his thinking, especially with regard to the shortcomings in
training, equipment, system of command and intelligence. He spent the rest
of his career trying to correct the shortcomings that had been identified. He
also wrote about them extensively in his book, Forging the Shield: A Study
of the Defence of India and South East Asia. Though he did not refer to the