Page 254 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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During his stint at the IMA, Prem had to perform another task which was
                to have wide-ranging repercussions. After the 1962 debacle in NEFA, there
                was  a  public  outcry  at  the  humiliation  suffered  by  the  nation,  and  Prime

                Minister  Nehru  agreed  to  institute  an  enquiry.  The  NEFA  Enquiry,  as  it
                came  to  be  known,  was  to  be  headed  by  Lieutenant  General  Henderson-
                Brooks, who was then GOC 11 Corps at Jullunder. Prem Bhagat was to be
                the sole member, and in January 1963 was attached as Brigadier General
                Staff  to  Headquarters  11  Corps  for  this  purpose.  During  the  next  three
                months, he travelled extensively to the areas where the operations had taken
                place.  He  met  hundreds  of  officers,  JCOs  and  men  to  get  a  first-hand

                account of the events that had taken place. He also had to study thousands
                of operational orders and instructions, war diaries and other documents to
                piece the story together.
                   The Enquiry Report was submitted to the COAS on 12 May 1963, and he
                in turn forwarded it to the Defence Minister on 2 July 1963. Though it had
                been ordered by the Army Chief, the Ministry of Defence decided that its

                contents should not be made public, and it was graded ‘Top Secret’. This
                was  probably  because  it  showed  certain  failings  on  the  part  of  Nehru,
                Krishna Menon and a few others in the government, as well as the army.
                However, Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan made a statement in Parliament on
                2 September 1963, in which he referred to certain portions of the report and
                its recommendations.
                   The four specific terms of reference which the enquiry had been asked to

                examine  were  shortcomings  in  training  and  equipment;  system  of
                command;  physical  fitness  of  troops;  and  capacity  of  commanders  at  all
                levels  to  influence  the  men  under  them.  The  enquiry  decided  to  include
                three other points pertaining to operational aspects in order to come up with
                a more comprehensive picture. It thus also covered intelligence; staff work
                and procedures; and the higher direction of operations. Though the report

                was  never  made  public,  Neville  Maxwell  was  somehow  able  to  lay  his
                hands on it, and he has written about it in his book, India’s China War.
                   Prem’s exposure to the real story of the NEFA debacle had a profound
                effect  on  his  thinking,  especially  with  regard  to  the  shortcomings  in
                training, equipment, system of command and intelligence. He spent the rest
                of his career trying to correct the shortcomings that had been identified. He
                also wrote about them extensively in his book, Forging the Shield: A Study

                of the Defence of India and South East Asia. Though he did not refer to the
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