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had  to  employ  the  ‘walking  wounded’  from  military  hospitals  to  occupy
                positions on the perimeter of ‘Fortress Dacca’.
                   The rapid advance of 101 Communication Zone Area under the command

                of Major General G.S. Nagra, who had replaced Major General G.S. Gill
                after the latter was wounded, was also facilitated by the paradrop at Tangail
                on 11 December. On that day, 4 Corps was in Narsingdi, 35 kilometres from
                Dacca, while the leading elements of 95 Infantry Brigade, commanded by
                Brigadier  H.S.  Kler,  were  in  Jamalpur,  160  kilometres  from  Dacca.  Two
                days later, on 13 December, 95 Infantry Brigade and 2 Para were still at
                Tangail,  almost  100  kilometres  from  Dacca,  while  Sagat’s  troops  had

                reached the Satlakhya river and were just 10 kilometres from Dacca. Nagra
                was lucky to find a tarmac road running south, a few miles west of Safipur,
                which led to Dacca via Sabhar without having to cross the water obstacles
                of  Turag  and  Dhaleshwari.  Even  at  midnight  on  14  December,  when  95
                Infantry Brigade was still on the Turag river, elements of the 57 Infantry
                Division  of  4  Corps  had  crossed  the  Satlakhya,  and  had  started  shelling

                Dacca.  Sagat  would  have  reached  Dacca  first,  but  this  honour  went  to
                Nagra, who had been placed under Sagat’s command on 15 December and
                was thus technically a part of 4 Corps when he entered Dacca. However,
                though Nagra was the first across the finish line in the race for Dacca, the
                real winner was undoubtedly Sagat. If the Pakistanis had not surrendered,
                there is no way 101 Communication Zone could have taken Dacca earlier,
                since it would have required a major assault. Since Sagat had firmed in at

                Narsingdi and already planned the attack for 16 December, in all likelihood
                the  honour  of  taking  the  city  would  have  gone  to  him.  That  he  lost  the
                chance does not in any way detract from his brilliant performance. Sagat
                was also anxious to avoid entering the built-up area of the city, where the
                Pakistanis would have had an advantage over Indian troops.
                   Sagat’s decision to cross the Meghna proved to be crucial to the entire

                operation.  This  was  also  the  first  instance  in  military  history  of  an  ‘air-
                bridge’ being used to cross a major water obstacle by a brigade group. In
                his book, Victory  in  Bangladesh  ,  Major  General  Lachhman  Singh,  who
                commanded 20 Mountain Division, which was part of 33 Corps during the
                campaign, writes:

                   It was here that Sagat Singh exhibited the genius and initiative of a field commander. It was this
                   decision which finally and decisively tilted the scale in our favour and led to the early surrender
                   of the Pakistani forces at Dacca.
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