Page 288 - Leadership in the Indian Army

Rangpur, Bogra and Rajashahi; the third comprised territory west of the
Padma, including Kushtia, Jessore and Khulna; and the fourth was the
Dacca Bowl, surrounded by rivers on all sides—the mighty Meghna and

Lakhaya to the east, the confluence of Meghna and Padma to the south,
Padma and Burhi Ganga to the west, and a branch of the Jamuna, which
joins the Meghna, to the north. Due to its geo-strategic importance, Dacca
had always been chosen as the capital by successive rulers.
The task allotted to Eastern Command by Army HQ was to destroy the
bulk of Pakistani forces in the theatre and occupy a major portion of East
Pakistan. The capture of Dacca was not included in these instructions.

Based on this, Eastern Command evolved its operational plan and allotted
tasks to its subordinate formations. 2 Corps was given the task of advancing
from the west and capturing all territory west of the river Padma; 33 Corps
was to advance from the north-west and capture all territory up to the
confluence of the Padma and the Jamuna; and 4 Corps was to advance from
the east and capture all territory east of the river Meghna. The task of

capturing the area of Mymensingh, between the Meghna and Jamuna rivers,
was allotted to 101 Communication Zone Area.
Though this had not been spelt out in the instructions issued by Army HQ,
Sam Manekshaw had visualised that after all three corps had achieved their
tasks, the forces would be regrouped and launched for the capture of Dacca
from the west, after crossing the Padma at Golundo Ghat. For this
regrouping, 4 Corps was to shed 23 Mountain Division, all its medium

artillery, and two squadrons of PT-76 tanks. In the event, there was no
regrouping since 2 Corps could not cross the Madhumati and 33 Corps
could only reach Bogra. Dacca was captured purely by chance, by forces
that had never been intended to reach there.
The operation commenced on 4 December 1971, after Pakistan had
launched airstrikes on a number of Indian airfields in the early morning

hours of the previous day. According to plan, 2 Corps entered East Pakistan
from the west, 33 Corps from the north, and 4 Corps from the east. Under
Sagat’s command, in 4 Corps were three mountain divisions, with their
normal complement of supporting arms and services. In addition, he had
been allotted two ad hoc squadrons of light PT-76 tanks, and a medium
battery of 5.5-inch guns. The divisional commanders were Major General
(later General) K.V. Krishna Rao (8 Mountain Division); Major General

R.D. ‘Rocky’ Hira (23 Mountain Division); and Major General B.F.