Page 283 - Leadership in the Indian Army

their bayonets, and accounted for many of the enemy. Both Harbhajan and
Dagar lost their lives in the action, which developed into a full-scale battle
lasting three days. Sagat asked for some medium guns, which were moved

up to Kyangnosa La, at a height of over 10,000 feet. The artillery
observation posts, which Sagat had sited earlier, proved their worth in
bringing down effective fire on the Chinese. Because of lack of observation,
and the steep incline west of Nathu La, most Chinese shells fell behind the
forward defences and did not harm the Indians. At one stage, soon after
their CO was wounded, there was a dip in the morale of 2 Grenadiers, and
some troops occupying the South Shoulder had started upsticking (pulling

out). Sagat borrowed a sten from another officer, and with the help of the
Subedar Major, pushed the men back into the trenches.
The Indian casualties in the action numbered just over 200—65 dead and
145 wounded. The Chinese are estimated to have suffered about 300
casualties. Though Sagat’s attempt to mark the border with a wire fence had
been approved by the higher authorities, the large number of casualties

suffered by both sides created a furore. Of course, the casualties among
Indian troops would not have occurred if they had remained in their
defences and not exposed themselves by coming out of their trenches and
rushing at the Chinese post. But seeing their CO fall, the troops had lost
their cool and rushed forward under the orders of the young officer who lost
his life in the action. Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora visited Nathu La to
assess the situation, and advised Sagat to prevent further escalation of

hostilities and avoid casualties among Indian troops. The Chinese had
already announced that it was the Indians who had begun the conflict, and
the large number of Indian bodies and wounded soldiers they had taken
seemed to support their claim. However, Sagat was not perturbed. The
Chinese had been instigating him, for the last two years, and had killed
several Indian soldiers during this period. The specter of the 1962 Chinese

attack still haunted the military and political leadership in India, preventing
them from taking effective action against them. This was the first time the
Chinese had got a bloody nose, and the myth of their invincibility was
broken.
At the time that Sagat was commanding 17 Mountain Division, the author
was also serving in the divisional signal regiment as a young captain. The
entire formation seemed to have imbibed the aggressive spirit of the

Divisional Commander, and morale was very high. The author recalls an