Page 278 - Leadership in the Indian Army

Contrary to popular perception, the Portuguese did not surrender their
enclaves without a fight. In Goa the opposition was limited, but in Daman
and Diu they put up stiff resistance. The destruction of the Indian wireless

station had disrupted communications between Goa and the other enclaves,
and this may have accounted for the spirited defence put up by the
Portuguese. However, both Daman and Diu were occupied on 19
December, with the support of the IAF and the Indian Navy and
accompanied by heavy artillery shelling. This resulted in several casualties
among troops as well as civilians.
Before the operations, there had been considerable speculation about the

parachute brigade and its chances of success in a ground role. In fact, Air
Vice Marshal Pinto and Mr Handoo, the Director of IB, had started a betting
book, and wagers were made on the timings that the paratroopers had set
for themselves. After the surrender, when Pinto came to Panjim with
Chaudhury, he told Sagat that thanks to him, he had lost Rs 500. The Army
Commander, who had laid three bets, lost all of them. Another interesting

sidelight of the Goa operations was the propaganda about Indian troops
being barbaric and indisciplined, spread by the Portuguese authorities in the
hope of hardening the resolve of their troops. In fact, it had exactly the
opposite effect. After the surrender, when 1 Para arrived at Altinho military
camp, they found a large number of Portuguese officers and soldiers in their
vests and underpants, cowering with fright. When asked why they were
dressed so strangely, they confessed that they had been told that the Indian

troops would kill all those found in uniform. Lieutenant Colonel Sucha
Singh, VrC, MC, and his men had a good laugh at this absurdity.
Though the Goa operations were conducted along expected lines, the
speed of the Indian advance surprised many observers. The credit for this
goes to Sagat and his troops, who exceeded their brief and managed to
reach Panjim, which they had not been asked to do. The fact that 17

Infantry Division, in spite of the vastly superior resources at their disposal
and almost no opposition from the enemy, could make little headway,
shows that the going was not easy. If the paratroopers succeeded, it was
because of their better fighting spirit, morale and leadership. The ability to
take risks and seize fleeting opportunities are the hallmark of a successful
military leader, and Sagat proved beyond doubt that he had these qualities
in ample measure. The failure of Indian troops barely a year later when

facing the Chinese only served to underline the point that, irrespective of