Page 274 - Leadership in the Indian Army

50 Para Brigade began its move from Agra on 2 December, and reached
Belgaum on 6 December. By now, with the IAF backing out, the drop by 2
Para had been cancelled, and the battalion, which had moved to Begumpet

earlier, also joined the brigade in the concentration area. Another battalion
joined the brigade in Belgaum and became its third battalion. This was 2
Sikh Light Infantry, which had been performing garrison duties in Madras
and had no collective training for a considerable period. They were also not
fully equipped, and lacked even boots. Also, being a non-para unit, the
battalion was not imbued with the characteristic esprit de corps and elan of
the ‘red berets’. However, Sagat welcomed them and tried his best to make

them feel at home. Since an encounter with some Portuguese armour was
expected, Sagat was allotted 7 Light Cavalry, less a squadron, equipped
with Stuarts, and B Squadron ex-8 Cavalry, which had AMX tanks.
However, being designed for an airborne role, the brigade was woefully
short of transport. After much cajoling, Sagat managed to get some Nissan
one-ton trucks.

The brigade moved to Savantvadi on 13 December, and thence to its
assembly area east of Dodamarg on 16 December. Meanwhile, 17 Infantry
Division had also commenced its move from Ambala on 2 December, and
had concentrated in Belgaum by 12 December. A tactical headquarters was
established by HQ Southern Command at Belgaum on 13 December, from
where the Army Commander and his staff functioned. The D-Day for the
operation was initially set for 14 December, but was later postponed due to

an attempt to avert the conflict and resolve the problem by diplomatic
means. It was finally decided that the operation would commence on the
night of 18 December.
Three days before D-Day, the COAS, General P.N. Thapar, accompanied
by Lieutenant General P.P. Kumaramangalam, the Adjutant General, and
Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhury, the Army Commander, visited the

brigade, and Sagat went through his plan for the operation with them. At the
end of the presentation, the Army Commander expressed some reservation.
He felt that Sagat’s timings were too optimistic and that it may not be
possible to keep to them. But Sagat insisted that the timings were feasible,
and the visitors left after wishing the brigade good luck. On his return to
tactical HQ, the Army Commander conveyed his doubts to his staff.
However, Air Vice Marshal Pinto and the Chief of Staff, Major General

P.O. Dunn, as well as G.N. Handoo of the IB, who knew Sagat well,