Page 272 - Leadership in the Indian Army

In July 1954, volunteers of the United Front of Goans liberated Dadra and
Nagar Haveli. A year later, on 15 August 1955, about 3,000 people entered
Goa to offer ‘satyagraha’ (a non-violent form of protest, practised by

Mahatma Gandhi). The police opened fire, killing and wounding a large
number of the protesters. This led to a wave of anger among the Indian
people, and considerable public pressure on the Indian government to
liberate Goa. The Government of Portugal rejected all offers made by the
Indian government, and refused to even discuss the matter. The issue was
raised in the United Nations in 1960, but Portugal refused to provide any
information about its colonies. This resulted in a resolution by the UN

Trusteeship Council in November 1961, condemning Portugal’s refusal and
asking all member-states to ‘deny any help to Portugal, which could be used
for the subjugation of the people of the non-autonomous territories under
Portuguese administration’. In October 1961, during a seminar on
Portuguese colonialism held in New Delhi, Prime Minister Nehru indicated
that India had now started thinking of using ‘other methods’ of liberating

the colonies. The army was accordingly warned about the possibility of a
military operation, so that it could begin preparations. When, on 18
November 1961, the Portuguese fired on an Indian vessel—SS Sabarmati—
from Anjidiv island, wounding the Chief Engineer, the Indian government
decided to act and the army was ordered to go in. Two warships of the
Indian Navy—the Kirpan and the Rajput—were sent from Bombay to the
Karwar coast, on 28 November. On 30 November 1961, the government

took the decision to liberate Goa and all other areas under Portuguese
control through a combined operation involving all three services.
On 29 November 1961, Sagat received a telephone call from ‘Monty’
Palit—who was the Director of Military Operations (DMO) at Army HQ—
asking him to rush to Delhi. Sagat commandeered a Dakota of the
Paratroopers’ Training School, and was in Palit’s office in less than an hour.

There he learnt about the operation for the liberation of Goa and his own
role in it. He was informed that the CGS, Lieutenant General B.M. Kaul,
would be holding a meeting later in the day to finalise the plans. Sagat spent
the next few hours studying the terrain and acquainting himself with a brief
history of Goa. At the meeting in the evening, Sagat was informed that a
battalion group from his brigade would be used in an airborne role. Since
time and the riverine obstacles were the main considerations, Sagat

suggested that 2 Para be dropped at night in the Ponda area, so that the