Page 273 - Leadership in the Indian Army

water obstacles of the rivers Sanquelim, Bicholim, Usgaon and Candepar
could be overpassed. The AOC-in-C Operational Command, who was also
present, expressed his inability to undertake a drop at night. Sagat then

suggested that one company be dropped at dawn, another at first light, and
the rest of the battalion by day. This was accepted and Sagat returned to
Agra in high spirits. They next day, when they heard about proposed drop,
there was considerable excitement and jubilation in the brigade. 2 Para was
moved to Begumpet (Hyderabad) and immediately began training for the
drop.
The terrain in Goa favoured the defender, and precluded the use of armour

due to the large number of rivers and inland creeks. The Portuguese had
about three battalions of infantry and one squadron of wheeled armoured
cars. The naval element consisted of one frigate, the Albuquerque, equipped
with 120 mm cannons. There was no air force worth the name, except for
two transport planes of the Portuguese civil airline TAIP. The total number
of soldiers, including Goans serving in the Portuguese forces, was about

5,000 in Goa and 750 each in Daman and Diu.
The operation for the liberation of Goa, code-named ‘VIJAY’, was
planned for 14 December 1961. Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhury, GOC-
in-C Southern Command, was entrusted with the task. In order to pre-empt
international intervention and prevent reinforcements from Portugal
reaching Goa, it was essential for the operation to be quick and decisive.
After a quick appreciation, Chaudhury decided to mount a two-pronged

attack. The main force, comprising 17 Infantry Division, was to move into
Goa from the east, while 50 Parachute Brigade, under Brigadier Sagat
Singh, was to mount a subsidiary thrust from the north. Major General K.P.
Candeth, GOC 17 Infantry Division, was placed in overall command of the
taskforce. Daman and Diu were to be simultaneously tackled by a battalion
each, while the Indian Navy was to capture Anjidiv island and blockade the

ports of Margao, Vasco and Daman. The Indian Air Force was assigned the
task of destroying the airfield at Dambolim and the wireless station at
Bambolim, in addition to providing close support to the ground troops. To
ensure that the Indian troops were not held up on the obstacles, a large
amount of bridging equipment was grouped with the main column. A
paradrop by a battalion group of the Parachute Brigade was also planned
near Panjim, to capture vital bridges before they could be destroyed by the

Portuguese.