Page 280 - Leadership in the Indian Army

their posts at Nathu La and Jelep La. According to the Corps HQ, the main
defences of 17 Mountain Division were at Changgu, while Nathu La was
only an observation post. In the adjoining sector, manned by 27 Mountain

Division, Jelep La was also considered an observation post, with the main
defences located at Lungthu. In case of hostilities, the divisional
commanders had been given the authority to vacate the posts and fall back
on the main defences. Accordingly, orders were issued by Corps HQ to both
divisions to vacate Nathu La and Jelep La.
Sagat did not agree with these orders. Nathu La and Jelep La were passes
on the watershed which comprised the natural boundary. The MacMahon

Line, which India claimed as the International Border, followed the
watershed principle, and India and China had gone to war over this issue
three years earlier. Vacating the passes on the watershed would give the
Chinese the tactical advantage of observation and fire into India, while
denying the same to our own troops. Nathu La and Jelep La were also
important because they were on the trade routes between India and Tibet,

and provided the only means of ingress through the Chumbi Valley.
Younghusband had used the same route during his expedition 65 years
earlier, and handing it over to the enemy on a plate was not Sagat’s idea of
sound military strategy. Sagat also reasoned that the discretion to vacate the
posts lay with the divisional commander, and he was not obliged to follow
instructions from Corps HQ in this regard.
In the event, 27 Mountain Division vacated Jelep La, which the Chinese

promptly occupied. However, Sagat refused to vacate Nathu La, and when
the Chinese became belligerent and opened fire, he also opened up with
guns and mortars, though there was a restriction imposed by Corps on the
use of artillery. Lieutenant General (later General) G.G. Bewoor, the Corps
Commander, was extremely annoyed, and tried to speak to Sagat and ask
him to explain his actions. But since Sagat was with the forward troops and

not at his headquarters, his GSO 1, Lieutenant Colonel Lakhpat Singh, had
to bear the brunt of Bewoor’s wrath.
The Chinese had installed loudspeakers at Nathu La, and warned the
Indians that they would suffer as they did in 1962 if they did not withdraw.
However, Sagat had carried out a detailed appreciation of the situation and
reached the conclusion that the Chinese were bluffing. They took up
threatening postures, such as advancing in large numbers, but on reaching

the border always stopped, turned around and withdrew. They also did not