Page 281 - Leadership in the Indian Army

use any artillery for covering fire, which they would have certainly done
had they been serious about capturing any Indian positions. Our own
defences at Nathu La were strong. Sagat had put artillery observation posts

on the adjoining high features called Camel’s Back and Sebu La, which
overlooked the Yatung valley for several kilometres. This allowed Sagat to
bring down accurate fire on the enemy, an advantage that the Chinese did
not have. Vacating Nathu La and gifting it to the Chinese would have been a
tactical blunder. Ultimately, Sagat’s fortitude saved the day for India and his
stand was vindicated, two years later, when there was a showdown at Nathu
La. Today, the strategic pass of Nathu La is still held by Indian troops,

while Jelep La is in Chinese hands.
During the crisis, the Chinese managed to occupy Jelep La, but had
gained nothing in the sector under Sagat’s division. This was galling, and
they continued to pressurise the Indians by making threatening gestures. In
December 1965, the Chinese fired on a patrol of 17 Assam Rifles in North
Sikkim, at a height of 16,000 feet, killing two men. Though the patrol was

in Indian territory, the Chinese claimed that it had crossed over to their side.
They made regular broadcasts from loudspeakers at Nathu La, pointing out
to Indian troops the pathetic conditions in which they lived, and comparing
their low salaries and lack of amenities to those enjoyed by officers. It was
a form of psychological warfare at which the Chinese were adept, and had
to be countered. Sagat had similar loudspeakers installed on the Indian side,
and tape-recorded messages in the Chinese language were broadcast

everyday. He kept looking for a chance to avenge the Indian soldiers who
had fallen to Chinese bullets. Throughout 1966 and early 1967, Chinese
propaganda, intimidation and attempted incursions into Indian territory
continued. The border was not marked, and there were several vantage
points on the crestline to which both sides claimed ownership. Patrols
walking along the border often clashed, resulting in tension and sometimes

even casualties.
In 1967, Sagat discussed the problem with the Corps Commander,
Lieutenant General J.S. Aurora. He suggested that the border at Nathu La
be clearly marked to prevent such incidents, and offered to walk along the
crestline to test the Chinese resolve. If they did not object, the line along
which he walked could be assumed as being acceptable to them. The
suggestion was cleared and, accompanied by an escort, Sagat began his

walk along the crest. The Chinese commander also walked alongside,