Page 285 - Leadership in the Indian Army

Shortly before Sagat’s posting to 101 Communication Zone Area, a mixed
Naga–Mizo gang had been formed in Manipur to collect weapons and
ammunition from East Pakistan. The gang attacked a platoon outpost of 16

Jat, and after inflicting heavy casualties, got away with their weapons and
ammunition. The gang then advanced towards Burma and ambushed a
company column of 8 Sikh, again causing heavy casualties and taking away
their weapons. It then overran a platoon outpost of 30 Punjab, and took their
weapons as well. Subsequently, the gang ambushed a column of 2/11
Gorkha Rifles, and another of 5 Para, before crossing over into Burma. It
was at this juncture that Sagat was asked to take charge and retrieve the

situation.
Soon after taking over, Sagat decided to visit the battalions to assess the
situation at close quarters. He visited every battalion deployed in the Mizo
Hills, spending a night with each. After talking to everyone and analysing
the encounters that had taken place, he was able to pinpoint three major
reasons for the reverses suffered by our troops. These were lack of

intelligence, lack of attunement of the infantry battalions to insurgency
situations, and ill-treatment of the locals by a few post commanders. Sagat
immediately set about remedying these weaknesses, and issued directions
towards this end.
In his typical style, he devised his own intelligence gathering system by
compromising some of the key members of the Naga–Mizo gang. Instead of
sending them to jail, he kept them near the base at Aizawl, where he had

already moved his tactical headquarters. Their families were also brought
there, and they began to help our troops by giving intelligence reports,
identifying hostiles during cordon and search operations, and translating
captured documents. Sagat also realised that the underground hostiles must
be having their own systems for getting information and passing orders.
From the few letters that had been recovered by the battalions, he was able

to lay his hands on the stationery, letterheads and seals used by them and
had them copied in Calcutta. More information about the organisation and
the routine followed by its messengers was acquired. Thereafter, small
ambushes were laid, the messengers intercepted, their bags searched and the
papers they were carrying replaced with fakes.
The next problem was to adjust the training of the infantry battalions to
suit the peculiar requirements of counter-insurgency operations. An ad hoc

training camp was started with a few officers who had been serving in the