Page 320 - Leadership in the Indian Army

defences were contacted. He tasked 19 Infantry Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier Mohinder Singh, to carry out the operation, for which he was
given 9 Para Commando and some armour as support. He decided not to

use the bulk of the armour, since he realised that it would take several days
to ferry the tanks across the river, and once in the salient, it would be
extremely difficult to retrieve them for the subsequent advance towards
Sialkot, which was his main task.
19 Infantry Brigade commenced infiltration on the evening of 5
December 1971. The operation achieved complete surprise, and the leading
battalion found well-prepared defences, which were not occupied as they

had been vacated by the Pakistanis. In spite of this, the leading troops made
slow progress, since they insisted on following set piece battle drills, losing
precious time. The situation called for bold and audacious action, but the
commanders were overcautious and refused to exploit the factors of
surprise and demoralisation of the enemy. The motor vehicles of the follow-
up battalion kept getting bogged down in the soft sand of the rivulets and

streams that they had to cross, and this further slowed down their pace.
Bakshi arranged to set up roadblocks, using his tanks and the para
commandos. However, most of the enemy was able to withdraw before the
roadblocks were in place. In one case, some armour that had been inducted
into the salient to hasten its clearance, clashed with the roadblock armour,
which mistook them for withdrawing Pakistani tanks. Timely intervention
by the Brigade HQ staff averted what could have been a disaster. The para

commando roadblock at one of the ferries was attacked by a large body of
withdrawing Pakistani troops, and had to be rescued by tank-mounted
infantry which was rushed to their aid. By the evening of 7 December, the
salient was cleared of the enemy and Chicken’s Neck had been captured.
Enemy casualties were 32 killed, four wounded, and 28 captured, including
two officers. Leaving a battalion to hold the salient, Bakshi withdrew the

remainder of the brigade for other tasks.
The capture of Chicken’s Neck within 48 hours did a lot to raise the
morale of the Indian forces in the sector. The operation was brilliantly
conceived, and had it been pursued with greater vigour by the leading
elements a large number of prisoners would have been captured. In an
operation reminiscent of the capture of Hajipir pass in 1965, Zoru Bakshi
had once again proved that in war, it is not numerical superiority but daring

and audacity which bring success. After the capture of Chicken’s Neck, 26