Page 369 - Leadership in the Indian Army

expected to be received by the divisional commander, or at least one of the
brigade commanders, whenever he visited any part of the state. Hanut’s
predecessor, Major General ‘Tich’ Sharma, had extended these courtesies to

the Governor, but Hanut decided to put a stop it. Shortly after he took over,
the Governor decided to visit North Sikkim, and the brigade commander
requested Hanut’s permission to receive him. Hanut told him that there was
no need for him to do this since the Governor’s visit was at the behest of the
civil administration, and the army had nothing to do with it. However, if he
visited any place where an army unit was located, the local unit commander
could be present at the time of his arrival and departure.

When Talyarkhan landed at the helipad he was incensed because, as he
put it, ‘only a lieutenant colonel’ was present to receive him. On his return
to Gangtok, he immediately rang up Hanut, who was not available because
he was at his prayers. This further enraged the Governor, who threatened to
complain about this to the COAS. He tried to speak to the Army Chief over
the Post and Telegraph circuit, but could not do so because the lines were

down. When Hanut heard about this, he directed that the Governor’s call be
conveyed on army channels, which was done. Naturally, nothing came out
of it. When Hanut was asked about the incident, he pointed out that there
was no protocol requiring an army representative to receive the Governor,
unless he was visiting army units. In fact, he made it clear that this time one
of the battalion commanders had been asked to receive him because it had
become an established practice, and he did not want to make any abrupt

changes. In the future, no army officer would be present. When Talyarkhan
found that Hanut could not be browbeaten, his attitude changed and
relations between them, though formal, became more cordial thereafter.
However, Hanut’s relations with Lieutenant General Surjit Singh Brar, the
Corps Commander, were not so cordial. They had differences of opinion on
almost everything, which included operational and administrative aspects.

Hanut found the operational plans very passive, and wanted to introduce a
more aggressive form of defence. This called for substantial reserves at
every level, and the only way these could be created was by restructuring
the deployment. As was his practice, Hanut ran a sand model exercise,
which he conducted personally, in order to apprise the division’s officers of
the concept. Brar, who attended the discussion, was openly critical. In order
to avoid an unseemly argument in front of junior officers, Hanut terminated