Page 366 - Leadership in the Indian Army

complete disarray. At this decisive moment they would have to sally forth
and finish off the remnants of enemy armour. As he had foreseen, this
opportunity presented itself at 1100 hrs on 16 December, when the

counterattack by Pakistan 8 Armoured Brigade was decisively repulsed.
Some of the more enthusiastic officers of Poona Horse asked Hanut on the
radio when he was going to launch them into action, as had been planned.
But the enemy response was far stronger than Hanut had anticipated, and he
did not want to risk leaving the bridgehead undefended. The brigade and
divisional commanders were listening in on the radio, but did not react.
Hanut told his Adjutant to convey a message to the brigade commander on

the brigade net, requesting him to ‘build up sister unit fastest’. Since the
enemy was monitoring the net, the message could not be made more
explicit. But Vaidya failed to grasp its significance and did nothing. The
second armoured regiment—4 Horse—was moved to the bridgehead only
after last light on 16 December, on the instructions of the corps commander.
Thus, a magnificent opportunity was lost, and the ceasefire saw them still

confined to the bridgehead.
On 16 December, there were six major units in the bridgehead, three from
47 Infantry Brigade, and three from 16 Armoured Brigade. However, none
of the brigade commanders was there to issue orders. Hanut was the senior
CO, and his orders for readjustment and redeployment were issued on his
own initiative, in consultation with the others. In fact, as Hanut recounts,
the first time he saw any senior officer during the battle was just a few

hours before the ceasefire on 17 December, when the Corps Commander,
Lieutenant General K.K. Singh, came to visit and congratulate the regiment,
accompanied by the Divisional Commander, Major General W.A.G. Pinto,
and Brigadier A.P. Bhardwaj, Commander 47 Infantry Brigade.
In the various post-mortems carried out after the war, and in the After
Action Reports, commanders at all levels glossed over their lapses and

weaknesses. In the euphoria of victory, everyone indulged in mutual praise
and congratulations. Hanut brought up these weaknesses during discussions
and debriefings, and also mentioned them in his After Action Report. This
caused a lot of resentment among some senior officers, who felt that he was
being unnecessarily critical. But Hanut had very definite ideas about
command in battle and the responsibility that goes with it. In armour
battles, command has to be exercised from ‘up front’, and he always made

sure that his own tank was positioned at the point of contact. This enabled