Page 362 - Leadership in the Indian Army

allowing 17 Horse to break out the same night. The operation began on the
night of 13 December, and 91 Infantry Brigade secured a bridgehead across
the minefield. The Engineers began trawling and, by 2330 hrs, a safe lane

for tanks had been cleared. At 0230 hrs, the combat group commenced the
breakout.
After going some distance, the combat group came across some tank
tracks. They conjectured that the tracks belonged to enemy tanks that had
withdrawn from the Barkaniyan minefield, and would lead to a suitable
crossing place over the Basantar. The regiment had made an elaborate
navigation plan—with compass bearings and night charts—showing the

route from point to point, but it was felt that following the tracks would
speed up their movement and save time. Abandoning the navigation plan,
the combat group began to follow the tracks. This proved to be a mistake
since the enemy tanks, instead of crossing the Basantar, had veered off east
and crossed a tributary of the Basantar. When the combat group reached the
nullah in the early hours of 14 December, they found the crossing unmined

and undefended. Only then did it dawn on the two COs that they had hit a
tributary rather than the main Basantar nullah. The combat group quickly
swung round to get back on the original axis, but it was soon daylight, and
the area was found to be boggy. They decided to defer the attempt, and the
tanks were dispersed. As it turned out, the Basantar was heavily defended
and too formidable to have been breached by an encounter crossing, so the
failure to reach the correct place turned out to be a blessing in disguise.

Though the regiment suffered a number of casualties due to air attacks
during the day, these were nothing compared to what they would have
suffered had the encounter crossing been attempted.
Over the next two days, enemy resistance on the home side of the obstacle
was systematically cleared, and on 15 December, a deliberate operation was
launched across the Basantar nullah. 47 Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier

A.P. Bhardwaj, was made responsible for securing a bridgehead. The
brigade had three battalions, 13 Grenadiers, 6 Madras and 16 Madras, in
addition to 17 Horse and 18 Rajputana Rifles less two companies. The plan
involved the capture of area 2r in the Ghazipur reserve forest, including
Saraj Chak by 16 Madras in phase one, followed by the capture of Jarpal
and Lohal by 13 Grenadiers in phase two. 17 Horse and 18 Rajputana Rifles
less two companies were to protect the bridgehead against enemy

counterattack. On the following day, 13 Grenadiers, supported by a