Page 357 - Leadership in the Indian Army
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overall strategy, Lieutenant General K.P. Candeth, GOC-in-C Western
Command, had planned certain offensive operations with the intention of
drawing out Pakistani reserves and weakening their ability to undertake
major offensives against India. An advance by 1 Corps into the Shakargarh
bulge was part of these plans.
Lieutenant General K.K. Singh, GOC 1 Corps, had been the DMO at
Army HQ before assuming command of 1 Corps in October 1971. He was
thus familiar with the overall strategy and plans for the operations. He had
three infantry divisions (36, 39 and 54), two independent armoured brigades
(2 and 16), two independent artillery brigades and two engineer brigades.
He also had a locating battery and an air observation post squadron. 36
Infantry Division, under Major General B.S. Ahluwalia, was initially
deployed south-east of the Ravi river, in the Thakurpur–Gurdaspur–
Dinanagar area; 39 Infantry Division, under Major General B.R. Prabhu,
was north of the Ravi, in the Madhopur–Bamial–Dayalchak area; and 54
Infantry Division, under Major General W.A.G. Pinto, was deployed around
Samba, between the Bein river and the Degh Nadi.
Lieutenant General K.K. Singh, known as ‘KK’, had commanded 1
Armoured Brigade during the 1965 War, and Poona Horse had been under
his command at that time. In 1971, he was given the task of containing the
enemy offensive, and then forcing them back by delivering a riposte against
their lines of communication. In case the enemy did not launch an
offensive, KK was to advance into the Shakargarh bulge east of the Degh
Nadi, and capture Zafarwal, Dhamtal and Narowal. Subsequently, he was to
secure the line Marala–Ravi link canal–Degh Nadi and later take Pasrur.
KK appreciated that the best way to carry out the allotted tasks was to go on
the offensive. He planned to do this in the central sector of the corps zone,
retaining a strong defensive posture on the flanks. According to the plan, 54
Infantry Division was to advance between the Degh Nadi and the Karir
Nadi, led by 16 independent Armoured Brigade less 16 Cavalry. 39 Infantry
Division, led by 2 Independent Armoured Brigade was to advance between
the Bien river and the Karir Nadi and guard the western flank. The eastern
flank was to be guarded by two brigades (one each from 26 and 39 Infantry
Divisions), supported by 16 Cavalry. 36 Infantry Division, supported by
Scinde Horse, was to hold a defensive position along the Ravi river.
Based on the information available, it had been appreciated that the
enemy would have laid three or four tiers of minefields, starting from the