Page 359 - Leadership in the Indian Army

After air-strikes against Indian airfields on the evening of 3 December
1971, Pakistan attacked Indian positions in Chhamb the same night,
preceded by heavy artillery bombardment of border outposts. The next day,

4 December 1971, Yahya Khan formally declared war. Indian counter-
offensive plans were immediately put into motion, in the eastern as well as
the western sectors. In the evening, 17 Horse received orders to deploy for
the protection of the firm base of 54 Infantry Division. This entailed
moving the regiment from east to west across the Samba T-junction.
Simultaneously, 7 Cavalry was asked to move from west to east across the
same choke point, to its forward assembly area west of Samba. The two

columns reached the choke point at the same time, and got stuck in a traffic
jam. Fortunately, the enemy artillery and air did not take advantage of this
disaster, and the chaos was sorted out only after the two COs personally
intervened. It was primarily the initiative of the junior leaders of both
regiments, who worked overtime to disentangle their respective tanks,
which enabled the regiments to reach their forward assembly areas by first

light.
At the border post of Galar Tanda, there was a 30-foot high observation
tower, which provided the Pakistanis a view of the Indian territory, and
could be used to bring down artillery fire over the concentration areas of
our troops. B Squadron was located at Gala, right opposite the tower, and
Hanut ordered them to destroy it. An accurate shot from one of B
Squadron’s tanks brought down the tower, signalling the start of the battle

in the 54 Infantry Division sector. A troop of Pakistani tanks, hidden behind
the tall grass, emerged on hearing the shot, and then pulled back in panic.
Hanut calculated that since the enemy tanks were moving freely along the
border, there were no minefields in that area. He conveyed this information
to Commander 16 Armoured Brigade, but Vaidya did not respond. The full-
scale attacks went ahead as planned.

91 and 74 Infantry Brigades launched their attacks for the capture of
Dandout–Chamana, Khurd–Chhahal and Mukhwal at 2000 hrs on 5
December. The infantry did not encounter any enemy, nor did the trawls
find any mines when they went through the anticipated minefield. Both
brigades secured their bridgeheads, and two squadrons of 17 Horse were
moved to protect their flanks. Shortly after midnight, 4 Horse was inducted
into the bridgehead, but commenced its breakout only at first light. By 0800

hrs, leading elements of 4 Horse had contacted the minefield astride