Page 51 - Election Book-ENG

of success in this suit is doubtful, considering past experience of
such election integrity lawsuits.

Allegations concerning electronic manipulation were, in fact,
made as early as 2019 when an administrative lawsuit was filed
demanding disclosure of the software and commands used in
early voting machines. !e courts rejected the lawsuit. And the
National Election Commission has strenuously resisted efforts
to insert transparency into the security of its systems, to include
ballot counting machines, ballot sorters, and NEC servers.

Indeed, NEC insisted – and continues to insist – that its
networks and hardware and software used to run South Korea’s
elections are perfectly secure and cannot be hacked. !is of course
only looks “outside in” and does not address what internal “bad
3
actors” with access to NEC systems might easily accomplish.

However, warnings and suspicions, being once ridiculed, about
NEC networks deserve to be taken far more seriously – if not as
almost a certainty.

Despite NEC opposition to any outside review of its operations
and activities, following the revelation that NEC networks
4
had been hacked by the North Korean Lazarus Group at least

3 NEC’s claims of being ‘hack-proof ought to raise eyebrows, as it brings to mind the American Cyber Security
and Infrastructure Agency (CISA) insisting in 2020 that the US election was the “most secure in history”,
including from outside hacking. And then two weeks later the US Government was hit with the biggest hack
in history. Who should have been responsible for preventing this? CISA.
And more recently, the US Government has admitted that China’s “Salt Typhoon” hacker group has gained
access to government systems and private telecom networks – after announcing that China’s “Volt Typhoon
group had insinuated itself into America’s critical infrastructure from 2021-2024.”

Challenges Facing the South Korean Electoral System - 2024 51