Page 52 - Election Book-ENG

half a dozen times in the 2022-2023 time frame, the National
Intelligence Service (NIS) was able to analyze and conduct
penetration tests of the NEC networks in mid-2023. It issued a
report on the matter in October 2023.

The following account from East Asia Research suggests that
warnings of NEC networks being compromised and a$ecting the
outcome of South Korean elections are not unfounded:

After North Korea hacked the NEC, which was confirmed
by the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the NEC initially
ignored the NIS and pretended it never received noti#cations.
When the NIS provided proof that is had contacted NEC, the
NEC falsely claimed that it is impossible to hack the electronic
vote counting machines that the NEC uses for elections in
Korea, and &atly rejected o$ers of consultation from the NIS
and the Ministry of Public Administration and Safety.

After further public outcry, the NEC grudgingly agreed to a
joint security inspection, but provided only limited access.

From July 17 to September 22, 2023, the NEC, the NIS, and
the Korea Internet & Security Agency (KISA) formed a joint

4 Although the North Korean Lazarus Group is cited as the outfit targeting South Korea, the PRC has always
been mentioned as posing a risk to South Korean networks, and was specifically fingered in the 2020
National Assembly elections given the Chinese Huawei parts in the voting hardware. As for claims of
Chinese involvement, there are grounds for serious concern in light of PRC’s “motive”, “access”, and “expertise”.
Motive: breaking the ROKUS alliance and getting the Americans off the Korean peninsula;
Access: easy, given the hardware and system layout and the Moon administration’s demonstrated close ties
with the PRC;
Expertise: Chinese hackers are world-class.

52 Election Fraud in South Korea: Documenting the Truth