Page 53 - Election Book-ENG
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security team to conduct security checks of NEC’s systems
with the participation of opposition observers recommended
by the National Assembly’s negotiating group.
!e NIS con#rmed that it was possible to:
• In#ltrate the internal network of the National Election
Commission through the Internet.
• Hack the “Integrated Electoral Roll System” that
manages voter registration status and voting status.
• Change the contents of the electoral roll, such as
marking “those who voted early as non-voters” or
“those who did not vote early as people who voted,” and
registering nonexistent ghost voters as normal voters.
• Print unauthorized ballots such as a ballot with the same
QR code as the actual early vote ballot.
• Steal information on ballots, such as the stamp of the
Board of Elections.
• Infiltrate the NEC network since unauthorized PCs
were connected to the communication equipment
installed at the early voting stations.
It was recently reported that the NIS discovered more troubling
facts, but did not publicize this at that time. The (NIS) found
records of election fraud by computer tampering through
forensics of a portion of the NEC’s servers during the joint
Challenges Facing the South Korean Electoral System - 2024 53