Page 53 - Election Book-ENG
P. 53

security team to conduct security checks of NEC’s systems
               with the participation of opposition observers recommended
               by the National Assembly’s negotiating group.


              !e NIS con#rmed that it was possible to:


               •    In#ltrate the internal network of the National Election
                    Commission through the Internet.


               •    Hack the “Integrated Electoral Roll System” that
                    manages voter registration status and voting status.


               •    Change the contents of the electoral roll, such as
                    marking “those who voted early as non-voters” or
                    “those who did not vote early as people who voted,” and
                    registering nonexistent ghost voters as normal voters.


               •    Print unauthorized ballots such as a ballot with the same
                    QR code as the actual early vote ballot.


               •    Steal information on ballots, such as the stamp of the
                    Board of Elections.

               •    Infiltrate the NEC network since unauthorized PCs
                    were connected to the communication equipment
                    installed at the early voting stations.

              It was recently reported that the NIS discovered more troubling
            facts, but did not publicize this at that time. The (NIS) found
            records of election fraud by computer tampering through
            forensics of a portion of the NEC’s servers during the joint




            Challenges Facing the South Korean Electoral System - 2024      53
   48   49   50   51   52   53   54   55   56   57   58