Page 220 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

economic dependency on China. While it is hard to imagine
that Russia would ever be able to replace China as North
Korea’s major economic supplier, the development of the
Russia-North Korea relationship may lessen China’s political
influence and leverage on Pyongyang. This may be one reason
why China appears to have regarded the development of the
Russia-North Korea relationship with caution and perhaps
even some suspicion. China has remained tight-lipped
regarding its views of the Russia-North Korea relationship,
neither criticizing nor embracing it.

As the two countries commemorate the 75th anniversary of
the establishment of the relationship with a year of China-
North Korea friendship, it should be possible to gain some
clarity on how the development of the China-North Korea
relationship may respond to developments in Russia-North
Korea relations. Certainly, neither China nor Russia will
likely be interested in allowing Kim Jong-Un to play on or
foment suspicions between Moscow and Beijing. Despite
their own “no-limits” partnership, it does appear that China
has some limits in mind in its support for Moscow as well as
for Pyongyang. For instance, China did not respond to the
idea of deepening trilateral military exercises that was floated
in advance of the Kim-Putin summit last September. It is
unlikely that Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang are interested
in mirroring the drive toward institutionalization of security
cooperation that has marked the development of the U.S.-
Japan-South Korea trilateral relationship. For this reason, it
appears that for now, we will not see the development of two
fixed and opposing blocs in Northeast Asia, despite the trend
toward clearly opposing alignments between the two sides.

220 Section III : South Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: How to Deter Pyongyang and Dissuade Beijing