Page 216 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

Korea to pursue its own objectives, with China’s enduring
economic and political support for North Korea as a baked-
in reality. Whereas previously, the United States may have
been tempted to rely on China for help or to request China to
use its own economic and political leverage on North Korea
as a source of influence or restraint on North Korea’s nuclear
development goals, that option is simply no longer available
for consideration. This backdrop defines the United States and
China as opposing forces, which reduces space for issue-based
cooperation, even if both sides share a limited shared interest
in keeping North Korea non-nuclear or in limiting the risks
posed by escalation of U.S.-North Korean tensions to a point
of conflict.

The impact of Sino-U.S. rivalry on the formation and
implementation of U.S. policy toward North Korea is
dual. On the one hand, the priority of North Korea as an
issue for Sino-U.S. consultation had in the past served as
a catalyst for generating decisive pressure on North Korea
and circumscribing Kim Jong-Un’s strategic options. But
the absence of Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea, even
rhetorically, removes the availability of one of the few levers on
North Korean behavior that has previously been demonstrated
to have the desired effect. The deepening of Sino-U.S.
rivalry means that the United States must resort to unilateral
measures targeting North Korea that serve to heighten
tensions with China. Meanwhile, the absence of direct U.S.
measures that can be used to influence North Korean behavior
leads the United States to hold China responsible for North
Korea, regardless of the extent of influence that China may
actually exert over Pyongyang.

216 Section III : South Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: How to Deter Pyongyang and Dissuade Beijing