Page 226 - Trilateral Korea Japan U.S. Cooperation

of denuclearization is no longer paramount. While Beijing
and Moscow would no doubt still prefer a denuclearized
Korean Peninsula and have genuine security and safety
concerns regarding Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program
(including serious proliferation concerns), they are no longer
prepared to put the pressure necessary on Pyongyang to bring
this about. In fact, as noted above, they are not even willing to
enforce “mandatory” sanctions. These were previously put in
place not only to stop more nuclear tests but also to prevent
proliferation and address lingering safety concerns should
nuclear testing resume. Some sanctions, unapologetically,
were designed as punishment for violations of other (multiple)
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions as well.

Russia and China now routinely turn a blind eye to sanctions
violations, when not serving as the main perpetrators
themselves, and routinely prevent the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) from even addressing much less enforcing
sanctions violations. Both also demonstrate daily their lack of
regard for basic human rights of their own people, much less
the people of North Korea. This “three versus three” dynamic
plays itself out almost daily at the UNSC. This guarantees that
neither the resumption of Six-Party Talks nor, regrettably, the
good offices of the UNSC are relevant to the management of
North Korean security and human rights challenges today.

As potentially disruptive as this “unholy” North Korea-China-
Russia alignment might be, it also has its weaknesses and fault
lines. None truly trusts the other two and their objectives,
while overlapping in some areas, do not always coincide. In
some significant ways, both Russia and North Korea, for

226 Section III : South Korea-Japan-U.S. Cooperation: How to Deter Pyongyang and Dissuade Beijing